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INJURED WOMEN BEFORE
COMMON LAW COURTS, 1860 - 1930

MARGO SCHLANGER*
21 HARVARD WOMEN ’S LA W JOURNAL 79 (1998)

INTRODUCTION
How did early American tort law treat women? How were they expected
to behave, and how were others expected to behave towards them? What
gender differences mattered, and how did courts deal with those differences?
These are the issues this Article explores. My aim is to illuminate the
common law of torts and its relation to and with ideas about gender
difference, by focusing on three sets of cases involving injured women,
spanning the time between approximately 1860 and 1930. 1
My conclusions run counter to two approaches scholars have frequently
taken in analyzing gender and the common law of torts. Some tort schola rs
neglect gender completely, omitting it as an important axis of analysis. For
example, in 1972, in his influential article A Theory of Negligence, Judge
Richard Posner wrote of cases involving injuries to train passengers boarding
and disembarking, the type of case discussed in Part III of this Article.2
Posner summarized the doctrinal rules as follows:

*
Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division; J.D., Yale
Law School, 1993; B.A., Yale College, 1989. The opinions expressed in this Article are mine
and not those of the Department of Justic e. I want to thank Samuel Bagenstos, Hugh Baxter,
Jules Coleman, William Forbath, Thomas Green, Jennifer Mnookin, and Peter Schuck for
reading earlier drafts. All errors, faults, and flaws that remain do so despite their helpful
comments. In addition, I should note the benefit I had of seeing Barbara Welke's valuable
work Unreasonable Women: Gender and the Law of Accidental Injury, 1870 - 1920, 19 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 369 (1994), in an earlier, unpublished form, some months after I began work on
the student paper that, much revised, became Part III of this Article. Her manuscript alerted
me to some of the cases discussed here.
1
I chose 1860 as the starting date because that year roughly corresponds with the
beginning of modern tort law. See, e.g., G. EDWARD W HITE , TORT LAW IN A MERICA : A N
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3 - 19 (1980). It is, in any event, the approximate year of the earlie st
cases I was able to find in these categories, except for one 1837 woman-driver case discussed
at text accompanying infra note 108 - 111. The end date is slightly more arbitrary. I simply
wanted a long enough time span from the beginning date to get a sense of any historical
progression, and enough cases after any observed change to provide an analyzable set.
2
Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
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The parties’ reciprocal duties in the boarding and alighting situations
were rather particularized. The railroad had to provide the passenger a
safe method of ingress and egress and the train had to remain stopped
long enough for the passenger to get to (or from) his seat. The
passenger, in turn, had to wait for the train to stop, or at least slow
considerably, before getting on or off; he had to watch where he was
stepping; and he had to use the route to and from the train provided by
the company. 3
The cases discussed in Part III make clear that when this passage omits
gender, and when it hides women plaintiffs, by using masculine language, it
erases something that contemporary courts considered crucial. Posner, of
course, is not alone. As feminist legal scholars surveying pre-feminist tort
scholarship and teaching have found, both gender and women have often been
notable in those arenas by their absence in analysis and their invisibility in
reporting. 4 The erasure of gender is especia lly marked in the tort theory
scholarship of the 1950s. For example, Fleming James wrote an entire article
about “The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases,” treating
such attributes as “judgment,” 5 “knowledge,” 6 “experience,” 7 “skill,”8
“physical, mental, and emotional characteristics,” 9 “age,” 10 and “sanity” 11
without even once discussing gender, or mentioning that women play a role in
the tort system.
Other scholars, though not themselves erasing women or omitting gender,
find that historical tort law itself committed a similar act of exclusion or
subordination in the development of an objective standard of care. In 1977, in
a study of tort law’s “reasonable man” standard, Ronald Collins wrote that
“exhaustive research has unearthed no common-law reference to a ‘reasonable

3

Id. at 60.
See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC.
3, 22 - 25 (1988) [hereinafter Bender, Lawyer’s Primer]; Leslie Bender, An Overview of
Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 575 (1993) [hereinafter Bender, Overview]
(surveying scholarship up to 1992 that corre cts this imbalance); Leslie Bender, Teaching Torts
as If Gender Matters: Intentional Torts, 2 VA . J. SOC. POL ’Y & L. 115, 115 n.1 (1994)
[hereinafter Bender, Teaching Torts] (surveying like scholarship between 1992 and 1994);
Lucinda Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 57 - 59, 63 - 65 (1989); Carl Tobias, Gender Issues and the Prosser,
Wade & Schwartz Torts Casebook, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 495 (1988).
5
Fleming James, The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 M O . L.
REV. 1, 4 (1951).
6
Id. at 5.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 15.
9
Id. at 17.
10
Id. at 22.
11
Id.
4
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woman.’”12 Instead, he argued, courts that considered the obligations of
women as potential injurers or victims of injury found that they were
incapable of reason, and so were to be treated, like children, as somewhat
incompetent in the eyes of the law. This he called the “unreasonable woman”
standard. 13 Judge Guido Calabresi similarly points out that the “reasonable
man” used to be described, as well as named, in explicitly masculine phrases;
he was “the man who takes the magazines at home and in the evening pushes
the lawn mower in his shirt sleeves.”14 Other scholars join Collins and
Calabresi in their belief that tort law used to measure care-taking by a
“reasonable man” standard that was, not just linguistically but truly, a
masculine one — that the construction was the once-unnoticed emblem of the
legal system’s substantive oppression and exclusion of women. 15 For
12

Ronald K.L. Collins, Language, History and the Legal Process: A Profile of the
“Reasonable Man,” 8 RUT. - CAM. L.J. 311, 315 (1977). Collins argued that women have
been named “unreasonable” by the common law, and that the construct of the reasonable man
is an instrument of women’s oppression. Id. at 315 - 20.
13
Id. at 317. A famous 1927 satire by A.P. Herbert offers a similarly depressing view of
the common law of torts:
[I]n all the mass of authorities which bears upon this branch of the law there is no
single mention of a reasonable woman . . . for the simple reason that no such being
is contemplated by the law; that legally at least there is no reasonable woman. . . .
It is no bad thing that the law of the land should here and there conform with the
known facts of everyday experience. The view that there exists a class of beings,
illogical, impulsive, careless, irresponsible, extravagant, prejudiced, and vain. . . is
one which should be as welcome and as well accepted in our Courts as it is in our
drawing-rooms. I find therefore that at Common Law a reasonable woman does not
exist.
A LAN PATRICK HERBERT, Fardell v. Potts, in M ISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 18 20 (1927). Herbert’s words, of course, were only mock-judicial. And h e came down just as
hard on the reasonable man as he did on the unreasonable woman — the reasonable man is, he
wrote, “[d]evoid, in short, of any human weakness, with not one single saving vice, . . . [an]
excellent but odious character.” Id. at 16.
14
GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, A TTITUDES, AND THE LAW : PRIVATE LAW
PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 23, 139 n.94 (1985) (quoting Hall v. Brooklands
Auto Racing Club, 1 K.B. 205, 224 (1933) (quoting unnamed “American author”)).
15
This point about the reasonable man standard has become something of a new received
wisdom. See, e.g., Hillary Allen, One Law for All Reasonable Persons, 16 INT’L J. SOC’Y AND
L. 419 (1988); Bender, Lawyer’s Primer, supra note 4, at 22 - 25; Martha Chamallas,
Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation:
A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 74 (1994) [hereinafter Chamallas,
Questioning Data]; Finley, supra note 4, at 57 - 59, 63 - 65; Caroline Forell, Reasonable
Woman Standard of Care, 11 U. T ASMANIA L. REV. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Forell, Reasonable
Woman]; Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL . L.
REV. 769, 770 - 80 (1994) [hereinafter Forell, Essentialism]; Robert Unikel, Comment,
“Reasonable Doubts”: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in American
Jurisprudence, 87 NW . U. L. REV. 326, 330 - 32 (1992); Stephen A. Zorn, Innocent Spouses,
Reasonable Women and Divorce: The Gap Between Reality and the Internal Revenue Code, 3
M ICH . J. GENDER & L. 421, 458 - 65 (1996).
Barbara Welke presents a more nuanced view, discussed below at text accompanying
notes 143 - 146. See Barbara Y. Welke, Unreasonable Women: Gender and the Law of
Accidental Injury, 1870 - 1920, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 369 (1994) [hereinafter Welke,
Unreasonable Women]. In the final analysis, Welke concludes that the “reasonable man”
standard was “patterned on the image of a man,” but that women were not held to this
masculine standard. Id. at 370 n.4. Rather, courts “defined due care differently for women
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example, Leslie Bender writes:
It was originally believed that the ‘reasonable man’ standard was
gender neutral. ‘Man’ was used in the generic sense to mean person or
human being. But man is not generic except to other men. . . . As our
social sensitivity to sexism developed, our legal institutions did the
‘gentlemanly’ thing and substituted the neutral word ‘person’ for
‘man.’ . . . Although tort law protected itself from allegations of
sexism, it did not change its content and character.16
The accusation of erasure draws strength from canonical historical texts
that explain the rules that guided early tort law’s treatment of many
“difference” issues. In 1837, in the famous case Vaughn v. Menlove,17 the
British Court of Common Pleas held that despite the apparently limited
mental faculties of the adult defendant, he was answerable for harm he caused
others in deviating from an objectively reasonable standard of behavior. A
defendant could not escape liability, wrote Chief Justice Tindal, by arguing
that he had acted to the best of his own ability:
Instead, therefore, of saying that the liability for negligence should be
co-extensive with the judgment of each individual, which would be as
variable as the length of the foot of each individual, we ought rather to
adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as
a man of ordinary prudence would observe.18
Justice Holmes enshrined this “objective” standard in The Common Law,
writing:

and men,” and, as the title of her article suggests, treated women as “unreasonable.” Id. at
370.
16
Bender, Lawyer’s Primer, supra note 4, at 22. See also Robin L. West, Relativism,
Objectivity, and Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1473, 1491 (1990) (book review) (“The reasonable person
doctrine in tort law is vulnerable to the complaint that it reifies the interests of some groups
while subordinating others.”).
17
132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837) (Tindal, C.J.).
18
Id. at 493. The case probably marked the first appearance of the “reasonable man” by a
slightly different name. The concept was familiar, however, from the law of bailments. See
SIR W ILLIAM JONES, A N ESSAY ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS 11 (1796) (“prudent man”).
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The standards of the law are standards of general application. The
law takes no account of the infinite varieties of temperament,
intellect, and education which make the internal character of a given
act so different in different men. It does not attempt to see men as
God sees them, for more than one sufficient reason . . . . [W]hen
men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of
individual peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is necessary to
the general welfare . . . . The law considers, in other words, what
would be blameworthy in the average man, the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence, and determines liability by that . . . .19
Thus, in the nineteenth century, courts held judgment-deficient adults to the
same standard of reasonable behavior as they held the unimpaired. 20
Looking at other kinds of tort parties, well-known nineteenth-century
sources indicate that under the common law, a person with a physical
disability, unlike a person with a mental disability, could escape tort liability
by acting with “such care as persons of like . . . condition are accustomed to
use.”21 And, similarly, we know that tort la w made allowances for the
inherent deficiencies of childhood. Again, looking at Holmes’ writings: “So
it is held that, in cases where he is the plaintiff, an infant of very tender years

19

OLIVER W ENDELL HOLMES, JR., T HE COMMON LAW 108 - 09 (1881). Acceptance of the
s tandard was by no means universal during this Article’s period. See, e.g., Hainlin v. Budge,
47 So. 825, 833 (Fla. 1908) (critiquing the “artificial or mythical ‘reasonably prudent man,’”
and noting that if “the conduct of either sex [must] be measured by the standard of the
mythical ‘reasonably prudent person’ [then] . . . the difficulties of the jury are increased”).
20
For early discussions more explicit on this point, if less iconic than Vaughn v. Menlove,
see cases cited in the Reporters Notes to RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF T ORTS § 283B (1977).
The Restatement itself presents a modern -day version of the same rule. Id. (“Unless the actor
is a child, his insanity or other mental deficiency does not relieve the actor from liability for
conduct which does not conform to the standard of a reasonable man under like
circumstances.”). As in the nineteenth century, the standard presented is an objective one.
21
Stringer v. Frost, 19 N.E. 331, 333 (Ind. 1888). But see SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON , 1
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE IN A LL RELATIONS § 336 (2d ed. 1901)
[hereinafter T HOMPSON ON NEGLIGENCE ] (stating as the rule that greater than ordinary care is
required of people who are blind, d eaf, aged, or otherwise infirm); accord Karl v. Juniata
County, 56 A. 78 (Pa. 1903). There was a contest between these two doctrinal positions,
though it is hard to see that any practical difference resulted. The rule that disabled people are
held to a s tandard of care set by reference to an ordinary level of care taken by persons with
the same disability eventually won out, and this has remained the applicable standard. See,
e.g., Fletcher v. City of Aberdeen, 338 P.2d 743, 746 (Wash. 1959) (finding that a disabled
person is liable only if that person did not act with “the care which a reasonable person under
the same or similar disability would exercise under the circumstances”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND ) OF T ORTS § 283 C (“If the actor is ill or otherwise p hysically disabled, the standard
of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man
under like disability.”).
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is only bound to take the precautions of which an infant is capable ; the same
principle may be cautiously applied where he is defendant.”22
But The Common Law and the other canonical historical texts of torts
contain no information about the place of women in the nineteenth-century
common-law vision of the world. And notwithstanding the recent explosion
in feminist torts scholarship,23 little scholarship actually examines and
discusses old accident cases to test a hypothesis of exclusion and consistent
oppression against their particular language and holdings. This Article essays
such a test, using as the field of study three categories of cases, involving
injuries to women who were passengers in cars and wagons, injuries to female
drivers of wagons, and injuries to women boarding and disembarking from
trains. Reported decisions in these categories evince common understandings
of gender differences courts considered relevant: that wives had less authority
than husbands, that women were less competent in the public sphere of
transportation than men, and that women were less physically agile than men.
This Article presents the interplay of those understandings and tort doctrine.
The results of this interplay were as complex as gender difference and tort law
themselves, and my project is one of thick description — to complicate rather
than to present a unified field theory of gender and tort.24 Nonetheless, one
solid conclusion to be drawn from all three categories is that, as might be
expected given the existence of female accident victims and the importance of
the ideology of gender to social ordering, the accusation of erasure of gender
difference is incorrect. Far from naively erasing gender by subsuming women
into the male category of “reasonable men” or a purportedly neutral, but no

22
HOLMES, supra note 19, at 109. For a discussion of the standard of care as applied to
children, see, e.g., 1 T HOMPSON ON NEGLIGENCE , supra note 21, at § 36, 37; Francis H.
Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 M ICH . L. REV. 9 (1924).
23
For surveys of the literature, see sources cited supra note 4.
24
Indeed, any attempt at a unified field theory could hardly rest solely on cases about
injured women. Men, too, have g ender, and early tort law did not limit its concern with
gender roles and gender difference to cases involving women. The scope of this Article is,
however, of necessity limited, and the cases presented here only hint at how tort law dealt
with gender in cases involving male accident victims. See Central of Georgia Ry. v. Carlisle,
56 So. 737, 738 (Ala. Civ. App. 1911) (duty of railroad to render a passenger assistance in
boarding and disembarking is “suspended” where the passenger is “attended by husband or
friend apparently capable of giving the needed assistance,” and finding that husband in the
case at bar could not be presumed unable to render assistance just because he carried a baby,
“for at least one arm may have nevertheless been left entirely fre e and available for other
uses”); Hurt v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 7 S.W. 1, 4 (Mo. 1888) (holding that railroad is
negligent if it fails to stop at station long enough for a man to help his family disembark and
declaring “[w]hen a man becomes a passenger on a railroad car with his wife and little ones,
he is their guardian and protector; he has the supervision of their safety; and the family group,
so far as the act of debarkation from the cars is concerned, is to be regarded to all intents and
purposes as a unit and indivisible integer.”); Hager v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 104 A. 599, 600
(Pa. 1918) (“[A]s a brakeman was present to help the ladies, it cannot be affirmed as a legal
conclusion that Mr. Hager was negligent in failing to wait and assist his wife in alighting.”);
Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. v. Yantis, 185 S.W. 969 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), discussed infra notes
171 - 173 and accompanying text.
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less male category of “reasonable persons,” courts actually treated gender as
an important factor in assessing appropriate standards of care.25 Neither do
the cases support a charge of invariable refusal to take account of women’s
experience, or of consistent deprecation of women’s capabilities. Each of the
three categories of opinions serves as a case study of tort law’s intricate
interaction with gender difference, illuminating the diversity of possible and
actual legal approaches to thinking about women’s agency, authority, and
capabilities. Together, in rhetoric, analysis, and result, they present a world
frequently, though not uniformly, friendly to women and their needs.26
25

Indeed, even a primary basis of this particular accusation — the masculine sound of the
phrase “reasonable man” — is less solid than the scholarship indicates. First, very few early
accident cases used a locution that emphasized “reason.” Instead, the cases used constructions
such as “prudence,” “ordinary prudence,” “care,” and “reasonable care” (words actually more
suited to the subject of taking precautions and assessing risk). Though it is probably best not
to make too much of such vocabulary choices, “prudence,” in particular, has different gender
connotations than “reason.” Many have argued that the very concept of “reason” includes an
anti-feminine subtext. See, e.g., Bender, Lawyer’s Primer, supra note 4, at 23 (“Gender
distinctions have often been reinforced by dualistic attributions of reason and rationality to
men, e motion and intuition (or instinct) to women.”). Prudence, by contrast, is a traditional
girl’s name — it connotes, if anything, femininity rather than masculinity. Moreover, tort law
standards were being stated in terms of a “person” as well as a “man” from the very earliest
days of American tort law. Indeed, the very case in which the precise expression “reasonable
man” seems to have appeared for the first time also used the words “reasonable person”:
Negligence is the omission to do something that a reasonable man guided upon those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The defendants
might have been liable for negligence, if, unintentionally, they omitted to do that
which a reasonable person would have done, or did that which a person taking
reasonable precautions would not have done.
Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049 (Ex. Ch. 1856) (Alderson,
B.J.). Courts talked about “persons” both when women were involved, see, e.g., Bigelow v.
Rutland, 58 Mass. 247, 248 (1849), and when men were involved, see, e.g., Railroad Co. v.
Jones, 95 U.S. 439, 441 - 42 (1877). (negligence is “the failure to do what a reasonable and
prudent person would ordinarily have done under the circumstances of the situation, or doing
what such a person under the existing circumstances would not have done”). Note, however,
that as discussed infra note 114, the word “person” is itself ambiguous — the non-gendered
word could be a placeholder (telling the reader to fill in the gender of the relevant actor), an
attempt at a more theoretical gender neutrality, or a random usage with no gender-related
subtext at all.
26
This Article barely touches on issues of race and class raised by the cases. It is worth
noting that the three categories likely had accident victims with differing demographic profiles.
The train cases mostly involved white women, of widely varying economic circumstances.
There are, however, a number of reported opinions that make clear that the accident victim was
African American. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 167. For useful discussions of some black
women’s experience of train travel, and the interplay of race, gender, and class in the law
governing train accommodations, see Patricia Hagler Minter, The Failure of Freedom: Class,
Gender, and the Evolution of Segregated Transit Law in the Nineteenth-Century South, 70 CHI.
- KENT L. REV. 993 (1995); Barbara Y. Welke, When All the Women Were White, and All the
Blacks Were Men: Gender, Class, Race, and the Road to Plessy, 1855 - 1914, 13 LAW & H IST.
REV. 261 (1995) [hereinafter Welke, Road to Plessy].
By contrast, I did not see any cases in the two car and wagon categories that mentioned an
African American accident victim. This is suggestive, if not conclusive, that the victims in
these cases were white. Cf. Welke, Unreasonable Women, supra note 15, at 374 n.14
(1994)(trial transcript in at least one train case revealed that accident victim, whose race was
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In the first set of cases, discussed in Part I, women were injured as
passengers in cars and wagons, usually when their husbands were driving.
During the entire period surveyed, the cases establish courts’ views of the
gendered relationship of wife to husband were of central analytic importance
to their legal assessments of a woman’s right to recover against a third party
who caused an accident. Part I-A explains that although the cases display a
relatively unchanging construction and presentation of the marital relationship
— assigning the wife, at least in the public space of the roads, to a subordinate
role to her husband — doctrinal changes from 1860 to 1930 precisely inverted
the legal result of this assignment. In the early part of the period, courts
concluded from women’s subordinate position in marriage that a female
passenger could not recover against a third party if her husband’s driving had
negligently contributed to the accident. But in 1890 or 1900, the results
shifted, and courts concluded from the same subordination that a female
passenger could recover in the same circumstances. Part I-B demonstrates
additionally that courts deciding whether a female passenger had herself been
contributorially negligent also considered gender norms relevant to the
inquiry; the idea that female authority and competence was lessened in public
spaces contributed to some courts’ decisions that the injured women
passengers before them had not been contributorially negligent.
Part II discusses a second set of cases, in which women drivers of wagons
were injured. Some nineteenth-century court decisions in this category
acknowledged and treated a perceived gender difference — that women were
inferior drivers to men. These opinions examined numerous doctrinal
possibilities for the role gender should play, but settled on none of them,
showing that a particular shared understanding about gender does not answer
the question of how gender should bear on the injured female tort plaintiff’s
right to recover. Later opinions dealing with female drivers, by contrast,
generally did not discuss gender at all.
Part III presents a third and final set of cases, in which women were
injured boarding and disembarking from trains. Underlying these decisions
was yet another, and related, shared understanding of a gender difference —
that women had more difficulty than men negotiating the world of train and
streetcar travel. Here, the defendant railroads’ legal status as common carriers

not mentioned in reported opinion, was African American). The car and wagon opinions also
reveal little information about economic status, but it is likely that the victims in these two
categories were more uniformly middle class, since their families necessarily owned cars or
wagons.
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framed how judges incorporated perceived gender difference into their
analysis. As in the first set of cases, though not the second, as courts in this
third category repeatedly confronted the perceived difference of women from
men, and decided whether and how to accommodate that difference, some
particularized rules and a fairly consistent caselaw developed. In a contextual
analysis that was not quite feminist, but not anti-feminist either, courts were
more likely to invite women into public spaces and to enforce access rules for
them than to exclude them, and were more likely to treat women as adults
with adult capabilities and responsibilities of self-care, than as children unable
to take care of their own safety.
Although their facts otherwise vary, the three sets of cases do share one
obvious factual feature — all involve transportation-related injuries. This
focus on transportation reflects early tort law’s similar focus 27 rather than any
claim that gender was at issue only in this subset of personal injury cases.28
And of course, courts also discussed gender in cases that did not involve
accidents at all. Divorce cases, rape cases, cases about such gendered torts as
seduction or alienation of affections — all were among the arenas in which
lawyers and courts discussed women and the law’s relationship to and
expectations for them. This Article presents just one piece of the puzzle.
I. WOMEN PASSENGERS
Historians agree that the dominant gender ideology in Americ a by the midnineteenth century and, with increasing ambivalence, into the early twentieth
century, was that of “separate spheres.”29 The division of the world into

27
According to Posner’s sampling of 1528 appellate court decisions from 1875 to 1905,
transportation cases amounted to a la rge majority of the docket. See Posner, supra note 2, at
53 (Table 2), 54 (Table 3), 63 (Table 4); see also LAWRENCE M. F RIEDMAN, A H ISTORY OF
A MERICAN LAW 300 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing preeminence of railroads in early tort law);
Welke, Unreasonable Women, supra note 15, at 381 - 82 (discussing frequency of railroad
and streetcar injury in the late nineteenth century); Thomas D. Russell, Blood on the Tracks:
Turn -of-the-Century Streetcar Injuries, Claims, and Litigation in Alameda County, California
(1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
28
As Professor Thomas Green commented to me, it would be interesting to examine the
role gender played in tort cas es involving female workers, given the exceedingly complex
gender ideology of work. See, e.g., CARL N. DEGLER, A T ODDS: W OMEN AND THE FAMILY IN
A MERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 362 - 435 (1982); T HOMAS DUBLIN, W OMEN
A T W ORK : THE T RANSFORMATION OF W ORK AND COMMUNITY IN LOWELL , M ASSACHUSETTS,
1826 - 1860 (1979); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO W ORK : A H ISTORY OF W AGE -EARNING
WOMEN IN THE U NITED S TATES (1982); Julie Novkov, Liberty, Protection, and Women’s Work:
Investigating the Boundaries Between Public and Private, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 857 (1996).
29
See, e.g., M ARY RYAN , W OMANHOOD IN A MERICA : FROM COLONIAL T IMES TO THE
PRESENT 113 - 19, 252 (3d ed. 1983) (discussing the “separate spheres” construct in its initial,
antebellum flowering, and in its early twentieth century conflicted, but powerful, state); Linda
K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman’s Place: The Rhetoric of Women’s
History, 75 J. A M. HIST. 9 (1988).
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public and private, male and female worlds, created a tension for women
using any means of transportation, because transportation took place in a
public, male space.30 But ideology bent to convenience: women frequently, if
less frequently than men, used trains, streetcars, wagons, or cars, even if their
use of these means of transportation ran counter to the separate spheres
concept.31 Both this Part and Part II deal with women in wagons or cars, the
most “private” and therefore the most acceptable conveyances for women.
Notwithstanding the privacy of a car, ideology dictated — and the cases
reflect — that where a woman and a man used a car together during the time
studied, almost invariably the man drove and the woman rode.32 When, as
often happened, the driver was the passenger’s husband, and the car was
involved in an accident, the issue frequently arose whether the alleged
contributory negligence of the husband should be “imputed” to his wife. As
this Part describes, before 1890 - 1900, the contributory negligence of a
husband-driver typically was imputed to his wife-passenger. As statutory
reforms to the law of coverture grew older, however, courts reversed this rule,
applying instead the non-marital law of agency, and holding that because a
wife did not have the right to control her husband, she was not responsible for
his contributory negligence. In addition, whatever the relation between
passenger and driver, the question of the passenger’s own contributory
negligence was also a nearly invariable subject of judicial attention, and one
in which gender played a role, because courts incorporated the norms of
female behavior into their analyses.33 This Part, then, uncovers and explores a

30

See, e.g., VIRGINIA SCHARFF, T AKING THE W HEEL : W OMEN AND THE COMING OF THE
M OTOR A GE 1 - 7 (1991).
31
See Carol Sanger, Girls and the Getaway: Cars, Culture, and the Predicament of
Gendered Space, 144 U. PA . L. REV. 705, 711 (1995) (discussing women’s persistent use of
public transportation despite constraints imposed on women by social convention before the
advent of the car); see also Patricia Cline Cohen, Safety and Danger: Women on American
Public Transport, 1750 - 1850, in GENDERED DOMAINS: RETHINKING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN
W OMEN ’S HISTORY 109 (Dorothy O. Helly & Susan M. Reverby eds., 1992) (discussing
women’s use of public transportation and accompanying risks of sexual proposition or
assault).
32
See Southern Ry. v. Priester, 289 F. 945, 947 (4th Cir. 1923) (when husband and wife
were together in car she owned, he drove; but she often drove in his absence); see also
SCHARFF, supra note 30, at 52 (“This companionable, hierarchical family, once set on wheels
. . . [drove in] wh at would become an archetypal configuration: a man behind the wheel, a
woman in the passenger’s seat . . . .”). Scharff also asserts that “fragmentary evidence . . .
suggests that before 1920, women comprised at most a small minority of drivers.” Id. at 25 26.
33
Contributory negligence was more important during the era discussed in this Article
than it is today, for two reasons. First, a finding of contributory negligence functioned as a
complete bar to liability. Second, courts then were more likely than they are now to consider
whether there was contributory negligence as a matter of law. My point is not that appellate
and trial judges always took cases away from the jury in this way, but that they almost always
considered that possibility, usually in some detail. For scholarly discussions of judicial
willingness or unwillingness to compensate victims of industry, see sources cited infra note
59.
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quite involved crossplay of gender and legal doctrine.
A. Imputed Negligence
The doctrine of “imputed negligence” originated in the 1849 British case
of Thorogood v. Bryan,34 a tort action seeking damages for the death of a man
who had just gotten off one omnibus, and was run over by another.35 The
defendant—the owner of the second omnibus—argued that the first omnibus
should not have let off passengers at the point where it stopped, and that its
negligence in doing so should bar the action. The Court of Common Pleas
agreed, attributing the contributory negligence of the first omnibus’s operator
to the decedent, and reversed the plaintiff’s jury verdict. In its original
application, assigning a common carrier’s negligence to its passenger, most
American courts were not receptive to the Thorogood imputed negligence
rule.36 In 1859, for example, the New York Court of Appeals held that the
doctrine would not apply in New York. 37 An injured passenger could not be
held responsible for errors made by the carrier, the court said, because he had
no control whatsoever over its operation. “Even as to selection [of the
carrier], he had only the choice of going by that railroad, or by none.” In
1886, in Little v. Hackett, 38 the issue came before the United States Supreme
Court, which summarized and adopted the majority rule established by the
state cases: “The identification of the passenger with the negligent driver or
the owner, without his personal co-operation or encouragement, is a
gratuitous assumption.”39
But while American courts became reluctant to uphold a fictional
identification of the passenger with the driver or conductor of a common
carrier, for some years they were more willing to merge the identities of a

34

8 C.B. 115 (1848), overruled by Mills v. Armstrong (The Bernina), 12 P.D. 58, 13 App.
Cas. 1 (1888).
35
An omnibus was a horse-drawn carriage operated like a modern city bus, taking on
passengers for short trips along a set route. Id. at 116, 117.
36
There were, however, scattered exceptions, chief among them Wisconsin and Montana
(for a time), and Michigan (in non-common-carrier cases involving adults). For detailed
discussions, see Schultz v. Old Colony St. Ry., 79 N.E. 873 (Mass. 1907) (analyzing many
state cases); Cuddy v. Horn, 10 N.W. 32 (Mich. 1881)(discussing law in Michigan); Mullen v.
City of Owosso, 58 N.W. 663 (Mich. 1894) (same); Cuddy v. Horn, 10 N.W. 32 (Mich. 1881);
Sherris v. Northern Pac. Ry., 175 P. 269 (Mont. 1918) (discussing law in Montana).
37
See Chapman v. New Haven R.R., 19 N.Y. 341, 344 (1859).
38
116 U.S. 366 (1886) (Field, J.).
39
Id. at 375.
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wife-passenger and her husband-driver. Courts found support in the
authoritative Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, which stated in its first
edition, in 1869, that although “a passenger in a public conveyance . . . is not
precluded from recovering” because of the contributory negligence of the
driver of that conveyance, the rule was the reverse “where a wife suffers an
injury while under the immediate care of her husband.”40 The treatise offered
no explanation, and cited just one case, Carlisle v. Town of Sheldon.41
Shearman and Redfield ignored the actual holding of Carlisle, an 1866
Vermont opinion premised entirely on Thorogood’s general rule that any
driver’s negligence should be imputed to any passenger. Carlisle expressly
stated that there was “nothing ni the marital relation” contributing to its
analysis; the same result would obtain, said the court, for any passenger and
any driver. 42
But a number of other courts agreed with Shearman and Redfield that there
was something different about a wife driven by her husband than a passenger
in some other circumstance. In a few cases, courts analyzed this not as a
question of imputed negligence at all. Rather, they held that because, under
the common law, a husband was a necessary plaintiff in a suit for injuries to
his wife, he could not “be permitted to create the cause of action by his
negligent or fraudulent conduct and then reap the benefit which this interest in
the action confers.” 43 The husband’s contributory negligence barred his
action for personal injury to his wife, and she, herself, had no right to sue
under the common law of coverture, which had “[f]or centuries [given]
husbands rights in their wives’ property and earnings, and prohibited wives
from contracting, filing suit, drafting wills, or holding property in their own
names.”44
Usually, however, courts in husband-driver/wife-passenger cases did not
explicitly rely on the common law of coverture. Indeed, they could not,
because most of the cases discussing the issue were decided after passage of
marital status reform statutes allowing women to hold separate property and

40
T HOMAS G. SHEARMAN & A MASA REDFIELD, A T REATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE
§ 46, 48 - 50 (1st ed. 1869) [hereinafter SHEARMAN & REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE ].
41
38 Vt. 440 (1866), obsolescence announced by Wentworth v. Waterbury, 96 A. 334 (Vt.
1916).
42
See id. at 447.
43
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Goodenough, 28 A. 3, 4-5 (N.J. 1893). Where this kind of
analysis was the basis of a bar against recovery for injury to wife-passengers, subsequent
passage of a “Married Women’s Property Act” changed the rule. See Peskowitz v. Kramer,
144 A. 604 (N.J. 1929) (overruling rule announced in Goodenough on basis of 1906 Married
Women’s Property Act). But under the same sort of rationale, even after married women
were allowed to bring suits in their own right, courts generally held that a husband’s
contributory negligence would bar his personal action for the wrongful death of his wife
because the statutory action accrued to him. See, e.g., Hazel v. Hoopeston-Danville Motor
Bus Co., 141 N.E. 392 (Ill. 1923).
44
Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights
to Earnings, 1860 - 1930, 82 GEO . L.J. 2127, 2127 (1994) [hereinafter Siegel, Marital Status
Law].
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to bring their own lawsuits.45 More typical than discussion of coverture was
the analysis in an 1877 Illinois case, in which the court commented that
because “plaintiff placed herself in the care of her husband, and submitted her
personal safety to his keeping,” any negligence on his part would be imputed
to her.46 This “placing in the care” language does not, facially, explain why
wives and husbands have any different relation for tort purposes than do
passengers and common carriers. After all, the passenger on a train relies on
the care of the conductor. Yet these decisions imputing the contributory
negligence of a husband-driver to his wife-passenger were, generally,
rendered despite courts’ rejection of the Thorogood rule. The exploration of
the topic of imputed negligence found in a jury charge in an 1891 federal case
provides some insight. The case concerned two adult siblings, driving
together, who were in an accident; the sister-passenger was killed, and the
question was whether the contributory negligence of the brother-driver would
be imputed to her. The judge explained to the jury that no such imputed
negligence would be allowed, and he contrasted the situation, in dicta, to the
imputation of the contributory negligence of a husband to his wife, and other
like circumstances:

45
See, e.g., 1861 Ill. Sess. Laws (Public) 143; Musselman v. Galligher, 32 Iowa 383, 384
(1871)(discussing Iowa’s marital status reform statutes); 1877 Conn. Public Acts, ch. 114.
The first such a ct was adopted in Mississippi in 1839. See FRIEDMAN, HISTORYOFAMERICAN
LAW , supra note 27, at 185; see also Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property Law:
1800 _ 1850, 71 GEO . L.J. 1359, 1398 (1983) (discussing Mississippi Act’s important
precursors). On the Married Women’s Property Acts generally, see id.; Richard H. Chused,
Late Nineteenth Century Married Women’s Property Law: Reception of the Early Married
Women’s Property Acts by Courts and Legislature, 29 A M. J. LEGAL HIST. 3 (1985); Linda E.
Speth, The Married Women’s Property Acts, 1839 _ 1865: Reform, Reaction or Revolution?,
in 2 W OMEN AND THE LAW : T HE SOCIAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 69 (D. Kelley Weisberg ed.,
1982); NORMA BASCH , IN THE EYES OF THE LAW : W OMEN , MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN
NINETEENTH _CENTURY NEW YORK (1982); FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF A MERICAN LAW , supra
note 27, at 185 - 86; KATHLEEN LAZAROU, CONCEALED UNDER PETTICOATS: MARRIED
W OMEN ’S PROPERTY AND THE LAW OF T EXAS, 1840 - 1913 (1986); M ARYLYNN SALMON ,
W OMEN AND the Law of Property in Early America (1986). Siegel, Marital Status Law, supra
note 44, at 2132 - 41, presents a helpful discussion of the historiography of marital status
reform.
46
City of Joliet v. Seward, 86 Ill. 402, 402 - 03 (1877); see also, e.g., Yahn v. City of
Ottumwa, 15 N.W. 257 (Iowa 1883); Nisbet v. Town of Garner, 39 N.W. 516, 517 (Iowa
1890) (explaining Yahn, and distinguishing the case of a wife and husband from that of an
unrelated passenger and driver) (repudiated exp ressly, but without analysis, by Willfong v.
Omaha & St. L. R.R., 90 N.W. 358 (Iowa 1902)); Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. v. Greenlee, 62 Tex.
344 (1884); Prideaux v. City of Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513 (1878). For cases adopting a rule
of imputed negligence in thes e circumstances, and cited elsewhere in support of the rule,
though they contain no discussion, see Huntoon v. Trumbull, 12 F. 844 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1882);
Peck v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R.R., 50 Conn. 379 (1882). Wisconsin was the only one of these
jurisdictions t hat, as a general rule, imputed the negligence of drivers to passengers. See
discussion in Schultz v. Old Colony St. Ry., 79 N.E. 873 (Mass. 1907).
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Now, there are certain circumstances, gentlemen, in which as a matter
of law the negligence of a driver of a carriage . . . may be imputed to
another person who occupies the vehicle with him; as, for instance, a
father is driving, and has a child in the carriage, or a husband is driving,
and has his wife there with him, or a guardian is driving with a ward
that he has under his care. [These] relations . . . are such that the law
may impute as a matter of law the negligence of the father, or husband
or guardian to the wife or the child or the ward, because . . . the one
controls the other, and where ordinarily, in the ordinary affairs of life,
we recognize the fact that the one trusts the other, and relies upon the
other for protection; that is, a husband exercises protection, and the
wife looks to the husband for protection. So in the case of the child
with the parent, and so in case of the ward with the guardian. 47
The charge indicates that when some courts said that a woman had “placed
herself in the care of her husband,” they meant far more than that she had
trusted him to drive her safely, the meaning of the phrase for Thorogood. The
phrase appears, rather, to have encapsulated the same theory of marriage that
underlay the superceded common law doctrine of coverture. Indeed,
Blackstone’s explanation of coverture in 1765 used language quite similar to
this federal jury charge: “[T]he husband and wife are one person in law [and]
the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband,
under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything.”48
In sum, in the earliest cases involving a contributorially negligent
husband-driver, and his wife-passenger, the husband’s contributory
negligence was frequently imputed to his wife, for the stated reason that she
was subject to his control. The most persuasive explanation of the doctrine is
that although the rule was announced after the technical end of coverture, it
drew on the common law understanding of marital status, which subsumed
wives’ identitie s in the identities of their husbands.
But this early majority rule was quickly reversed, beginning in the 1890s.49
47
Lapsley v. Union Pac. R.R., 50 F. 172, 181 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1891); see also Nisbet v.
Garner, 39 N.W. 516 (Iowa 1890)(contrasting the marital relation with that of a common
carrier passenger and driver).
48
1 W ILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON TH E LAWS OF ENGLAND 442 (1765)
(citations omitted).
49
However, there was no reversal in many community property states, where injured wifepassengers continued to be denied recovery for many years. See, e.g., Dunbar v. San
Francisco-Oakland Terminal Rys., 201 P. 330, 332 (Cal. 1921) (holding that wife barred from
recovering by the contributory negligence of her husband, both because she “is in [his] care”
and, “regardless of whether or not she was in his care,” because “recovery for [the wife’s]
injuries is community property, in which [the husband] shares and over which he has
control”); Ostheller v. Spokane and I. E. R.R., 182 P. 630 (Wash. 1919); sources cited in
Fleming James, Jr., Imputed Contributory Negligence, 14 LA . L. REV. 340, 348 n.44
(1954)[hereinafter James, Imputed Contributory Negligence]. In Texas, the first annunciation
of imputed negligence, in 1884, did not rest on a community property theory. See Gulf C. & S.
F. Ry. v. Greenlee, 62 Tex. 344 (1884). But in 1891, a new rationale was announced.
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. White, 15 S.W. 808 (Tex. 1891) (“With us, the proceeds of a recovery
become community property, the recovery is as much for the husband as the wife, and for that
reason his negligence would affect the right of recovery.”). This holding remained the law in
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Two historical developments are relevant to this reversal. The first was the
growing impact of the earlier-enacted Married Women’s Property Acts. It
seems to be generally true that the full impact of the reform statutes were felt
only slowly. For example, contemporary observer Elizabeth Cady Stanton
noted the slow pace of change following enactment of the new statutes,
writing in a letter that “[w]e already have a property law which in its
legitimate effects must elevate the femme covert into a living, breathing
woman—a wife into a property holder, who can make contracts, buy and sell.
In a few years, we shall see how well it works.”50 Modern observers, as well,
have written of the gradual reform effected by the Married Women’s Property
Acts in other areas.51 Thus, it is a plausible explanation for the changing
approach to claims of imputed negligence that courts increasingly realized in
the late nineteenth century that the wave of earlier legislation had undermined
common law tendencies to merge the identities of husbands and wives.
Indeed, one 1894 Georgia case acknowledged as much. The court cited the
abundant authority for imputing a husband-driver’s negligence to his wifepassenger, but rejected the rule, commenting that under Georgia law, she had
a right to recover damages, which became her “separate and individual
property, not subject to any debt or liability of the husband.”52 The court
called the “doctrine . . . that . . . would seek to charge a wife with the
negligence of her husband simply because of the marital relation existing
between the two indefensible,” and emphasized that “the wife has distinct,

Texas until a 1972 decision altered the community property rule. Graham v. Franco, 488
S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972).
50
See Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Gerrit Smith (Jan. 3, 1856), in 2 ELIZABETH
CADY STANTON: A S REVEALED IN HER LETTERS, DIARY , AND REMINISCENCES 63 (Theodore
Stanton & Harriot Stanton Blatch eds., 1969) (1922). I was alerted to this letter by Jacob Katz
Cogan, Note, The Look Within: Property, Capacity, and Suffrage in Nineteenth_Century
America, 107 YALE L.J. 473, 487 (1997).
51
See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2142 (1996) (“By mid_century, under the pressure of woman’s
rights advocacy, state legislatures had begun to enact legislation reforming the status incidents
of marriage; over the course of the century, these married women’s property acts gradually
transformed a marital regime in which a husband ruled and repres ented his wife into one
predicated in significant part on the juridical individuality of its partners.”); Siegel, Marital
Status Law, supra note 44, at 2149 - 57 (describing slow progress of common law reform in
New York state in late nineteenth century); see also Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618
N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. 1993) (“[R]everberations from the lifting of coverture slowly resounded
through the common law.”).
52
Atlanta & C. Air-Line Ry. v. Gravitt, 20 S.E. 550, 556 (Ga. 1894).
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individual, legal rights.”53 As Clare Dalton commented, the logic of the Acts
undermined “the ‘marital unity’ ideology, endowing women with legal
personality and capacity, and thereby recognizing their individuality.”54 It
seems likely that over time judges grew to understand and to apply that logic
to accident cases involving husband-drivers and wife-passengers.
Growing juridical separation of husbands and wives created a kind of
doctrinal vacuum in areas where decision rules had previously been based on
such a merger. In the area considered here, a “control test” lifted from other
areas of tort law promptly filled that vacuum. In the nineteenth century, the
rule of respondeat superior dictated that a “master” (i.e., employer) would be
held responsible in tort for the negligent act committed by its “servant” (i.e.,
employee). Hirers of independent contractors, however, were not responsible
for negligent acts committed by the contractors. The common law test that
evolved to distinguish employees from independent contractors focused on
whether the alleged employer had the right to control the alleged employee.
Use of a “control test” to distinguish “servants” from “contractors” was
announced in both this country and in Britain by 1850. 55 But the test gained
wide currency only in the following decades.56 In the same time frame, the
right to control became dispositive of liability under the law of the “joint
enterprise,” under which persons with joint rights of control over an
instrumentality of harm are jointly liable for any harm caused by either of
them. 57
These doctrinal developments—by which one party answered for a second
party’s negligence only if the first party had either an equal or a superior right
to control the second’s actions—took place in contexts relating to corporate
and enterprise liability in the world of industry, with little similarity to the set
of cases discussed here.58 In those contexts, the person or entity that was
53

Id.
Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: Constraints and
Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG . L. REV. 319, 327 (1997).
55
See SHEARMAN & REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE supra note 40, at §§ 73 - 74, §§ 76 - 79, 82
- 84, 85 - 92 (setting out test as established law); Gerald M. Stevens, The Test of the
Employment Relation, 38 M ICH . L. REV. 188, 189 - 94 (1939) (discussing test’s origins).
56
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (1909) (announcing the control
test as binding under federal law, and citing cases from the 1890s and 1900s in support). On
the early cases and their fine distinctions, see Talbot Smith, Scope of the Business: The
Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 M ICH . L. REV. 1222 (1940).
57
See Fleming James, Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 T UL . L. REV. 161, 210 - 12 and sources
there cited (1954); Joseph Weintraub, The Joint Enterprise Doctrine in Automobile Law, 16
CORNELL L.Q. 320 (1931) (finding origin of joint enterprise doctrine’s control test in the law
of respondeat superior); Gilbert K. Howard, Note, Negligence—Driver’s Negligence Imputed
to Passenger in Suit by Third Party, 1 BAYLOR L. REV. 492 (1949) (origin of the doctrine of
joint enterprise was in area of commercial ventures; extension to automobile cases is
American innovation that focuses on mutual right of control and joint purpose, especially
mutual right of control).
58
The sources and cases discussing the development of the control test cited above — and
the cases they in turn rely on — are uniformly set in the arena of commerce and industry.
Indeed, the rule of respondeat superior developed with the rise of corporate enterprise. See
Fowler V. Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an Employer of an Independent Contractor,
10 IND . L.J. 494, 495 (1934) (“modern law of respondeat superior” arose at the end of the
seventeenth century, and both “the general principle of respondeat superior” and the “rule
pertaining to independent contractors . . . are in a very large sense the product of industrialized
54
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potentially vicariously liable was generally a defendant, not a plaintiff.
Accordingly, the limit on vicarious ilability imposed by these rules generally
worked to limit compensation to victims of accidents.59 But as the rules
society”); Weintraub, supra note 57, at 337 (criticizing application of joint enterprise doctrine
in automobile cases, and contrasting it with “application of a doctrine of imputed negligence
to the true master and servant, agency, and partnership relations” because in that original
arena the doctrine “seems reasonable, for usually such relations are connected with a
commercial venture and the business man may well be deemed to calculate this risk with the
expenses of his activities and perhaps insure against it”); John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for
Tortious Acts: Its History, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN A NGLO -A MERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 536
(Ernst Freund et al. eds., 1909) (rule of respondeat superior was “a c onscious effort to adjust
the rule of law to the expediency of mercantile affairs”). Accounts of the relation between the
imperatives of industrial expansion and respondeat superior and the independent contractor
exception vary in their perspectives, but not in their focus on the commercial arena. See
Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 123 - 24 (1916) (“In a
world where individual enterprise is so largely replaced, the security of business relationships
would be enormously impaired unless we had a means of preventing a company from
repudiating its servants’ torts.”); Roscoe T. Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good
Life, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 512 (1935) (“It would have been inconceivable that any court,
caught in this storm of [economic] expansion and imbued with the ideas of rugged
individualism then current, could have done other than find the law necessary to make the
contractor’s business thrive and to encourage immensely his employer.”). More modern
treatments of issues of vicarious liability and the control doctrine similarly focus on corporate
behavior. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the Sources and Limits
of Employee Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL . L. REV. 1705 (1996); Alan Sykes, The Boundaries of
Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related
Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 563 n.1 (1988); Alan Sykes, The Economics of
Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1259 - 79 (1984) (analyzing v arious elements of and
exceptions to the control doctrine in terms of economic efficiency).
59
The situation was complicated, however, by the fact that early control test cases very
often involved a worker injured by another worker’s negligence. In thes e circumstances,
under the control test, if they were subject to the control of the samemaster they were “fellow
servants” and their mutual employer was not liable; if they were subject to the control of
different masters (i.e., one of the workers was an independent contractor or worked for an
independent contractor), the employer of the negligent worker would be answerable for the
tort to the other worker. In this instance, a finding of non-control served the interest of
compensation of victims. See Delory v. Blodgett, 69 N.E. 1078 (Mass. 1904) (denying
recovery after finding that two workers were “fellow servants” and citing other related cases);
Delaware, L. & W. R.R. v. Hardy, 34 A. 986 (N.J. 1896) (finding no error in conclusion that
two workers were not “fellow servants” and upholding verdict for plaintiff); Standard Oil Co.
v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (1909)(same).
More general examination of tort law’s relationship with industry, whether performing a
subsidy or serving other interests, is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Lawrence
Friedman, Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Law in the Late 19th Century, 1987 A M. B. FOUND .
RES. J. 351, 352 - 54 (schematizing the work of various scholars on this issue). Somewhat
categorical claims about judicial unwillingness to compensate the victims of industrial
accident are made by, for example, FRIEDMAN, A H ISTORY OF A MERICAN LAW , supra note 27,
at 470 - 72; M ORTON HORWITZ, THE T RANSFORMATION OF A MERICAN LAW , 1780 - 1860
(1977); M ORTON HORWITZ, THE T RANSFORMATION OF A MERICAN LAW , 1870 _ 1960: T HE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory
Negligence, 41 U. ILL . L. REV. 151 (1946). Preeminent on the other side of this scholarly
debate is Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A
Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1743 (1981) (arguing that “[r]ailroad passengers were
only rarely denied recovery on account of contributory negligence”); Gary T. Schwartz, The
Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 641, 665 (1989) (finding the
presence of “judicial solicitude for the victims of enterprise-occasioned accidents and a
judicial willingness to resolve uncertainties in the law liberally in favor of those victims’
opportunity to secure recoveries”).
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became dogmas of tort law, rather than novel doctrines with limited
application, courts began following their logic in wife-passenger cases, and
the outcomes began to shift in favor of the female accident victims. As early
as the 1890s,60 and overwhelmingly in the first decades of the twentieth
century,61 courts found it no longer sufficient for defendants to argue that the
negligence of the husband should be imputed to the wife by reason of the
marital relation. Using either doctrinal label—respondeat superior, or joint
enterprise—the crucial issue for an assessment of liability was whether the
injured car passenger had the right to control the driver. If she did, then any
contributory negligence of the driver would be imputed to her. So defendants
accused of negligently causing injury to a wife-passenger, and seeking to
avoid liability by accusing her of contributory negligence, now had to
contradict contemporary gender norms and argue that the wife was the
“master” of the “servant” husband, or that they were engaged in a joint
enterprise. As one court summarized:
The negligence of the husband is not to be imputed to the wife unless
he is her agent in the matter in hand, or they are jointly engaged in the
prosecution of a common enterprise. The mere existence of the marital
relation will not have the effect to impute the negligence of the husband
or wife to the other.62

60
See Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. v. Creek, 29 N.E. 481 (Ind. 1892) (refusing to impute
husband’s negligence to wife); Reading Township v. Telfer, 48 P. 134 (Kan. 1897) (same);
Finley v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 74 N.W. 174, 174 (Minn. 1898) (“Plaintiff and her
husband were not engaged in a joint enterprise, and he was not her servant or agent”; therefore
his negligence was not imputable to her.).
61
As late as 1933, the issue was live enough for the Supreme Court to treat the rule as
open to question. See Miller v. Union Pac. R.R., 290 U.S. 227 (1933) (holding that
“[w]hether a passenger or guest in a public or private conveyance, having no control over its
movement, may be denied a right of recovery for personal injury or death on the ground of
contributory negligence, depends upon his own failure to exercise a proper degree of care, and
not upon that of the driver [regardless of whether] t he passenger is the wife of the driver.”).
62
Phillips v. Denver City Tramway Co., 128 P. 460, 464 (Colo. 1912).
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Another court emphasized the role of control:
Negligence on the part of a husband in driving an automobile,
therefore, cannot be imputed to his wife, who is riding with him, unless
the parties are engaged in an enterprise giving the wife the power and
duty to direct or to assist in the operation and management of the car.63
Doctrinally, then, there was a nearly complete reversal. Where the rationale
for imputing a husband’s negligence to his wife earlier had been the wife’s
lack of control, now that very lack of control allowed her to win her case.
Courts implementing these doctrinal changes described very different
types of moral intuitions than the courts that had held women to their
husbands’ care. In the very earliest case I found refusing to impute a
husband’s negligence to his wife, the court commented:
In our opinion, there would be no more reason or justice in a rule that
would, in cases of this character, inflict upon a wife the consequences
of her husband’s negligence, solely and alone because of that
relationship, than to hold her accountable at the bar of eternal justice
for his sins because she was his wife.64
Success for defendants under the new doctrinal categories appears to have
been rare, because it took unusual circumstances to create a joint enterprise.
In a 1921 Wisconsin case, for example, the court stated:
In one sense, husbands and wives in their journey through life are
always engaged in joint enterprises, sometimes successful, sometimes
disastrous. But the mere fact that they travel in the same car, whether
for pleasure or to change their abode, does not constitute a joint
enterprise within the meaning of the rule under decision. 65

63

Stevens v. Luther, 180 N.W. 87, 87 (Neb. 1920).
Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Creek, 29 N.E. 481, 482; see also T HOMPSON
NEGLIGENCE , supra note 21, at § 504:
64

there is no ground in reason or justice growing out of marital relations for making a
different rule from the one just discussed, for the case where a wife has committed
her safety to her husband — as where she is riding in a vehicle and he is driving —
than in any other case; and the weight of the authority is that in such a case, the
negligence of the husband is not imputed to the wife.
65

Brubaker v. Iowa County, 183 N.W. 690, 692 (Wis. 1921).
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Although they had grown to recognize women’s individuality, courts thus
did not alter their views of women’s limited authority. Judges simply were
reluctant to entertain the idea that a wife controlled her husband, or at least his
driving. The ideological component of such reluctance was brought out in an
1897 Kansas case:
[M]utuality or equality of direction or control does not exist in the case
of a journey taken by husband and wife. Say what we may in advocacy
of the civil and political equality of the sexes, there are conditions of
inequality between the same in other respects which the law recognizes,
and out of which grow differing rights and liabilities. . . . By the
universal sense of mankind, a privilege of management, a superiority of
control, a right of mastery on such occasions is accorded to the
husband, which forbids the idea of a co-ordinate authority, much less a
supremacy of command in the wife. His physical strength and
dexterity are greater; his knowledge, judgment, and discretion assumed
to be greater; all sentiments and instincts of manhood and chivalry
impose upon him the obligation to care for and protect his weaker and
confiding companion; and all these justify the assumption by him of the
labors and responsibilities of the journey, with their accompanying
rights of direction and control. The special facts of cases may show the
wife to be the controlling spirit, the active and responsible party, and
the husband an agent, or even a mere passenger; but in cases where
such facts are not shown the court must presume, in accordance with
the ordinary — almost universal — experience of mankind, that the
husband assumed and was allowed the responsible management of the
journey. 66

66
Reading Township v. Telfer, 48 P. 134, 136 (Kan. 1897). The law of joint enterprise is
sometimes applied even today in automobile cas es, but with a different sense of the
relationship between husband and wife. See, for example, Lightner v. Frank, 727 P.2d 430
(Kan. 1986), a wrongful death action following an accident allegedly caused by the
defendants, a wife driving a pick-up truck with her husband as the passenger. The court
refused to hold the husband liable for the wife’s alleged negligence, stating,

[t]he record is completely lacking in any testimony whatsoever that there was any
agreement or understanding . . . that Dale had the right to control Jessie’s operation
of an automobile. In the absence of any proof of a prior agreement or understanding,
we have no hesitancy in holding that a joint enterprise was not sufficiently
established in the case now before us. . . . Since [Telfer], the world has changed, and
any assumed superiority or mastery of a husband over a wife in driving an
automobile can no longer be recognized in Kansas law.
Id. at 434.
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Even without this kind of express substantive theory of the proper
relationship between husband and wife, the courts sometimes simply acted
on their perception of social reality. In a 1923 New Hampshire case,67 the
court held that in order for there to be a joint enterprise, and therefore to
attribute the husband-driver’s contributory negligence to his wifepassenger,
[t]here must be not only a joint interest in the objects of purposes of the
enterprise, but also “an equal right to direct and govern the movements
and conduct of each other with respect thereto.” . . . In the present case
there is no evidence that the plaintiff either had or attempted to exercise
any authority over the manner in which her husband operated his
automobile in which she was riding. . . .
....
There is in th[e] evidence not the slightest suggestion that the plaintiff
thought she had any joint part in directing the movements of the car.
Nor does it in any way point to the conclusion that she had such right,
either as a matter of law or in fact. It was the ordinary situation of the
wife and children riding with the husband and father. Had the
defendant’s counsel desired to establish the existence of an unusual
relation of the parties towards the operation of the car, it was incumbent
upon them to inquire further. 68
Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court said in 1913:
Common sense would dictate that, when a wife goes riding with her
children in a rig driven by her husband, she rightfully relies on him not
to drive so as to imperil those in his charge. The law does not depart
from common sense by requiring her under the circumstances shown
here to impugn her husband’s ability to drive and assume the
prerogative to dictate to him the manner of driving. With one child on
her lap, and another sitting next to look after, she might with human
and legal fairness and propriety leave the driving in the exclusive care
of the husband and father . . . . She frankly testified that she was
“scrooched down,” holding her baby, and “gawking around at things.”69

67

Bowley v. Duca, 120 A. 74 (N.H. 1923).
Id. at 75 - 76.
69
Williams v. Withington, 129 P. 1148, 1149 - 50 (Kan. 1913).
68
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Courts, then, refused to punish women-passengers for acting as gender norms
dictated, and leaving to their husbands the responsibility for safe driving.
On occasion, when the husband drove a car actually owned by his wife,
courts reversed their ordinary approach and found that her ownership of the
car gave her sufficient authority to justify attributing his contributory
negligence to her.70 But it was more likely in these circumstances that courts
would avoid the conclusion that the woman was actually in charge, even if
they had to struggle to do so. In a 1917 Virginia case, for example, the
defendant railroad conceded that normally a husband’s negligence is not
imputable to the wife, but argued that because the plaintiff-wife owned the
car, she should be bound by her husband’s negligence. 71 The court
responded with a close look at the facts, noting that the plaintiff had sent her
husband the car a week before the accident, for his own use in a city where he
was working for a while.72 Though she was in the car during the accident,
this was a coincidence, the court said. His control (as a gratuitous bailee) was
absolute, and hers nonexistent.73 Indeed she was not focused on the road but
was rather
talking from time to time to their guest, Stephenson. This conduct was
perfectly natural and such as is demanded by the ordinary rules of
courtesy. She had no reason to distrust her husband’s skill or
carefulness, and notwithstanding the advances made by modern women
towards political and economic independence of man, it still remains
true that the normal woman married to the normal man recognizes the
obligation of obedience contained in the marriage vow, and observes
the Pauline injunction to remain subject to her husband. 74
Again, even without such explicit ideological references, the typical
conclusion in cases where a husband drove his wife’s car was that his
contributory negligence was not imputed to her.75
Cases involving accidents that occurred where a wife was driving a car
owned by her husband-passenger underscore the gendered nature of this

70
See, e.g., Lucey v. Allen, 117 A. 539 (R.I. 1922) (attributing husband-driver’s
contributory negligence to wife -passenger who owned the car, even though she did not know
how to drive).
71
Virginia Ry. & Power v. Gorsuch, 91 S.E. 632 (Va. 1917).
72
Id.
73
Id. at 633.
74
Id. at 634.
75
See Southern Ry. v. Priester, 289 F. 945 (4th Cir. 1923) (citing, inter alia, Gorsuch,
supra note 71); Brenner v. Goldstein, 171 N.Y.S. 579 (App. Div. 1918).
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analysis. A husband’s car ownership, unlike a wife’s, seems invariably to
have ensured that any contributory negligence his wife committed would be
imputed to him. The fact that the wife had direct control over the wheel
simply did not suffice to outweigh the ideological imperative of male control.
Thus, in 1923, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s wife’s
negligence in driving his car would be imputed to him, because he “owned the
automobile, and was in no sense a guest of his wife, so he had control, along
with his wife, over the movements of the car.”76 The Court of Appeals of
Kentucky agreed, in a case in which the plaintiff, “who had been an invalid
for some time, was riding in his automobile with his wife who was operating
the machine.”77 The court held that her contributory negligence was
imputable to him, because she was “his agent in the operation of his
automobile at the time of the collision.”78 Indeed, the same rule applied
against a husband-owner when he was not even in the car, so long as he had
authorized its use by his wife. For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court
held in 1923 that “where a paterfamilias maintains an automobile for the
pleasure, use and convenience of his family and . . . authorizes members of
his family to use it for such purpose, he by so doing makes such pleasure uses
his affair, and constitutes members of the family so operating the car his
agents engaged in the prosecution of his affairs.” 79
Fleming James summarized cases in this area in two 1954 articles. He
commented in a footnote that “[a] possible distinction between them might
lurk in the notion that the husband is head of the family, and so has more
control when riding as a passenger in his own car than does the wife when
riding in hers.”80 Although he found it an open question “[w]hether this
notion reflects the facts of life in modern America,” he believed, as I do, that
“its presence in the judicial mind” is suggested by holdings and language in
some of the cases.81 It is beyond the scope of this Article to assess the
accuracy of judicial presentation in these cases of women’s authority in
marriage. The relevant point is that courts throughout the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century consistently noted the fact of men’s and women’s
inequality in marriage — but in 1890 - 1900 reversed the legal result of the
unequal marriage in cases involving husband-drivers and wife-passengers,
shifting the outcome from no-recovery to recovery for injured women.

76

Wisconsin & Arkansas Lumber v. Brady, 248 S.W. 278, 280 (Ark. 1923).
Standard Oil Co. of Kentucky v. Thompson, 226 S.W. 368, 369 (Ky. 1920).
78
Id. at 370; see also Gochee v. Wagner, 178 N.E. 553 (N.Y. 1931) (wife-driver/husbandowner-passenger case announcing general rule that contributory negligence of a driver is
imputed to the owner, where owner is present in the car).
79
Stickney v. Epstein, 123 A. 1, 4 (Conn. 1923).
80
James, Vicarious Liability, supra note 57, at 213 n.260.
81
Id.; see also James, Imputed Contributory Negligence, supra note 49, at 345 n.28.
77
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Overall, these wife-passenger cases demonstrate the compound nature of
judicial inquiry into women’s status, under which agency and authority are
separable legal and ideological concepts.
B. Contributory Negligence of the Female Passenger
Although the contributory negligence of a husband-driver was not
generally imputable to his wife-passenger by 1890 - 1900, the issue of
contributory negligence remained present. In cases involving husbands and
wives, and other female passengers and male drivers, juries were asked to
evaluate the actions of the passenger to see if she had exercised ordinary care.
This judgment too was imbued with gender-specific realities and assumptions.
In order to recover, an injured woman had to negotiate a tricky rhetorical path.
First she had to claim that she was not in control of the car, because that might
suggest a joint enterprise or agency relationship and accordingly defeat
recovery. At the same time, if she asserted too vehemently her own lack of
control, she ran the risk of being judged to have trusted so completely to the
care of the man driving as to constitute contributory negligence. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court summarized in 1916: “If Mrs. Fogg
trusted to the care and caution of her husband, her administrator cannot
recover; if she did not do so, there is no evidence that she did anything for her
own safety. There was evidence that as she approached the crossing she was
looking . . . in a different direction from the approaching train.”82
Accordingly the court reversed the plaintiff’s verdict. The same court applied
the same rule to allow a female plaintiff to recover five years later. 83 The
case had been tried to a judge, who returned a plaintiff’s verdict, assigning the
blame for the accident to the defendant and the plaintiff’s husband, but
allowing the plaintiff to recover because “she did not intrust herself in the
care, management and operation of the automobile to her husband at the time
of the accident.” 84 The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the judgment,
commenting, “the judge could find that at the moment of collision the plaintiff
was looking out for her own safety, and when faced with the emergency took

82

Fogg v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 111 N.E. 960, 962 (Mass. 1916). Similarly, the
Maine Supreme Court denied recovery to a plaintiff in a 1904 case, holding that although a
husband’s negligence should not be imputed to his wife, she herself was negligent because she
should have helped him guide the wagon’s blind horse. Whitman v. Fisher, 57 A. 895 (Me.
1904); see also Miller v. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry., 27 N.E. 339 (Ind. 1891) (plaintiff could
not recover because “[s]he took no precautions to warn her husband, or to avert the threatened
danger, although slight care might have avoided it”); Southern Ry. v. Priester, 289 F. 945 (4th
Cir. 1923).
83
McDonald v. Levenson, 131 N.E. 160 (Mass. 1921).
84
Id. at 161.
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every precaution which the circumstances permitted.”85 The idea that a
woman-passenger could be found contributorially negligent for “trusting to
the care of her husband” acted as a check on the new recognition of wives’
agency. In effect, a wife could forfeit her new legal claim to individuality by
a complete failure to guard her own safety.
More often, however, courts in female -passenger cases featured the rule
that “[t]he same degree of care is not required of a passenger riding in an
automobile as is required of the driver of the car.”86 As the Supreme Court of
Virginia said in a case involving a female passenger in a multi-passenger carfor-hire:
It is contended that some duty devolved upon [female] plaintiff [who
rode in the rear seat of the car] to warn and guide defendant as to his
route of travel, his speed, etc., and that neglect to discharge that duty
constituted such contributory negligence as to defeat recovery. . . . But
a duty to give such advice implies a duty to heed it, and the rear seat
driver is responsible for enough accidents as the score stands without
the aid of judicial precedent. The place for a passenger who knows
better than a driver of a car, when, where, and how it should be
operated, is at the wheel. 87
Occasionally courts made explicit the precise work that gender did in such
cases. In an 1897 federal case involving a female passenger in a hack, the
trial court charged the jury:
I am inclined to think that, if this plaintiff were a man suing for a
recovery, I should be constrained to advise you that he could be no
more relieved from the duty of looking out for the train than the driver
of the wagon; but this plaintiff being a woman, a person who is not
accustomed, or very much accustomed, to such places, and to going in
this fashion from one depot to another, I think it is a matter fairly for
your consideration whether she used the care and diligence which
should be expected of a person in her situation, in going across this
road. 88
On exception being taken by the defendant, the judge amplified:

85

Id.
Waring v. Dubuque Elec., 186 N.W. 42, 43 (Iowa 1922) (per curiam) (husband-driver,
wife-passenger).
87
Director Gen. v. Lucas, 107 S.E. 675, 677 (Va. 1921) (quoting Hedges v. Mitchell, 194
P. 620 (Colo. 1920)). See also Norfolk & W. Ry. v. James, 136 S.E. 660 (Va. 1927)
(surveying cases).
88
Denver & R. G. R.R. v. Lorentzen, 79 F. 291, 293 (C.C.D. Col. 1897).
86
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I do not state that to you, gentlemen, as a matter of law or proposition
of law, but simply as a matter for your consideration. I want you to
consider whether there is less diligence to be exacted or expected from
a woman than would be expected from a man. 89
The appellate court found no problem in the charge, noting,
Considering all that was said, it appears that the jury was left at liberty
to determine, as it had an undoubted right to do, whether, in view of the
plaintiff’s sex and all the surrounding circumstances, she exercised
such care and diligence as should reasonably be expected of her. This
was the proper test by which to determine if she was guilty of any
contributory fault.90
This case makes express the judicial expectation of women’s cession of
public spaces to men, and how such expectation influenced analysis of
contributory negligence. A more implicit adoption of the same expectation
underlay other courts’ analyses of contributory negligence in this context, as
well. For example, in a 1920 Missouri case the court wrote,
How a grandmother holding a six weeks [sic] old baby in her arms,
sitting between two other women in the rear seat of an automobile,
owned and being operated by her husband, who had been driving a car
for 10 or 12 years, and who she thought was a perfectly capable driver,
as a matter of law, was guilty of contributory negligence, under the
circumstances shown . . . in the case, we cannot understand. 91
And the Kansas Supreme Court held in 1916 that the wife of a driver of a car
hit by a train was under no obligation to warn him even of obvious dangers:
Why should the plaintiff have called her husband’s attention to the
conditions and exhorted him to use due care? She had confidence in
his ability as a driver. The conditions were just as obvious to him as to
her. . . . Why ought the plaintiff to have arrogated to herself control
over the automobile and commanded it to stop. . . . She knew his
ability as a driver and trusted him, and, what is more, she had the right
to trust him. 92

89

Id.
Id.
91
Corn v. Kansas City C. C. & St. J. Ry., 228 S.W. 78, 82 (Mo. 1920).
92
Denton v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 155 P. 812, 813 (1916). Not that wives never gave
their husbands advice about how to drive. See, e.g., Stenstrom v. Blooston, 224 N.W. 462
(Minn. 1929) (holding that where defendant driver would not listen even to his wife, when she
told him to slow down, his other passengers were not contributorially negligent in failing to
try to get him to drive more carefully).
90
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Cases like these etched the gendered ideology of separate spheres and the
masculinization of public spaces into the law of personal injury, in a way that
benefited the actual female accident victims, making their compensation more
likely.

C. Normative Implications
Analysis of gender, then, played an important and unhidden role in early
tort law’s resolution of claims involving women passengers in cars and
wagons; ideas about women’s autonomy and authority suffused judicial
analyses of women’s right to recover. Moving from the descriptive and
historical to the normative, it is tempting to give these cases a failing feminist
grade, concluding that they implemented an anti-female ideology of women’s
subordinate position in marriage, and, more generally, in society. 93 Tempting
but unfair. It is true that to acknowledge women’s lesser authority and
embody that acknowledgment in, for example, a jury instruction could be seen
as rewarding an accident victim’s compliance with a coercive and
subordinating hierarchy, and thus reinforcing that hierarchy. The accusation
has particular force for the cases that exhibited special relish in women’s
subordinate role.94 But I think a more appropriate evaluation emphasizes that
judicial refusal to recognize the social and ideological reality of women’s
lesser authority would have imposed an unduly high standard of self care on
women — a standard that would have required them to rebel against the
gender role strictures of society. Rather than coercing compliance with
gender norms, recognition of women’s subordinate role simply avoided
punishing individual accident victims for such compliance.95 Normatively
then, in my judgment, it was appropriate for the cases discussed in this Part to

93
I take the basic feminist principle to be that men and women are, or should be, mora l
and legal equals; giving content to the concept “equality” is beyond the scope of this Article.
For discussions of theories of equality and antisubordination, see, for example, CATHARINEA.
M ACKINNON , T OWARD A FEMINIST T HEORY OF THE STATE 215 - 37 (1989); Ruth Colker, AntiSubordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986);
Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment,
42 FLA . L. REV. 45, 56 - 63 (1990).
94
See, e.g., supra note 66 and accompanying text.
95
A rule that punished accident victims for their failure to comply with gender norms
would be far more problematic from a normative perspective molded by modern feminism.
This issue comes up in the train cases, discussed in Part III, when railroads alleged
contributory negligence based on female passengers’ failure to seek help getting off a train, or
based on male passengers’ failure to live up to norms of male agility. See Ft. Worth & D. C.
Ry. v. Yantis, 185 S.W. 969 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), discussed infra notes 171 - 173.
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incorporate into tort law socially constructed roles for men and women this
way.
II. WOMEN DRIVERS
Although women were mostly passengers, they were also occasionally
drivers.96 When women did drive, they sometimes were injured in accidents.
In the late nineteenth century, resulting court opinions occasionally discussed
gender, expressing a shared sense that women were not as capable drivers as
men. However, the time span in which cases involving women drivers
actually discussed gender was brief. By the early twentieth century, and the
replacement of the horse-drawn wagon by the automobile, evidence of
judicial consideration of gender difference in this area seems to have all but
disappeared. Whether women drove cars or horse-drawn vehicles, courts in
the twentieth century generally did not discuss the drivers’ gender as bearing
on an assessment of liability.
In the earlier cases, a range of doctrinal options existed for a court
confronting an accident involving a female driver and a claim that gender
difference was relevant: women might be bound to take more care to
compensate for their lack of skill; women might be held to commit
contributory negligence simply by driving; women might be held to a
standard of care that referenced only other women drivers (in practice, then,
their perceived lesser skill could excuse what otherwise might be contributory
negligence), or to a male standard of care, or to a bi-gender standard of care;
defendants might be required to take more care to accommodate women’s
needs as drivers. There are cases weighing each of these options, but no one
approach appears to have prevailed. These cases demonstrate that even
where courts share a view that women’s abilities are not as developed as
men’s, gender politics can intertwine with doctrine in complex ways that
produce very disparate approaches.
An 1860 Connecticut case provides an early example of the assumption
that women were bad drivers, and how that assumption could operate within a
personal injury case. In Fox v. Town of Glastenbury,97 the estate of Harriet
Fox sued the town, arguing that the accident in which she died was caused by
the town’s failure to maintain a railing along the sides of a causeway. 98 The
jury had rendered a plaintiff’s verdict, but the state supreme court vacated and

96

See SCHARFF, supra note 30, at 17.
29 Conn. 204 (1860).
98
As the facts of the cases presented in Parts I and II illustrate, in the days before highway
driving, personal injury cases involving harm to car or wagon drivers and passengers tended to
be of three types: suits against railroads arising out of car/train collisions; suits against the
town or county responsible for maintaining a road, alleging that a hazardous road condition
had caused an accident; and two or more car collisions.
97
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remanded for a new trial, holding that while the town’s failure to maintain a
railing along the causeway was in fact negligence, Fox’s attempt to make the
passage across the causeway was contributory negligence. The court stated
that “[w]e think no person of ordinary discretion in their circumstances, and
exercising ordinary prudence and discretion, would have made such
attempt.”99 This is a typical, linguistically gender-neutral standard of care,
apparently unexceptionable from a feminist perspective. But the court
continued:
We are not unmindful of the fact urged upon our attention by the
plaintiff’s counsel, that these travelers were females. And in that fact,
and in the timidity, inexperience, and want of skill which it implies, we
can find an explanation of their injudicious and fatal attempt to turn
around in the water, but no reason or excuse for the recklessness of
their conduct in driving into it. . . . [T]heir error was in rushing into
dangers which they had but too much reason to expect, and ought to
have anticipated and avoided. 100
The court concluded, “if men of ordinary prudence and discretion would
regard the ability of the party inadequate for the purpose without hazard or
danger, the risk should not be assumed.”101
It seems that in Fox the reviewing court merged together two questions:
What would a reasonable person do? and, What would a reasonable man
expect the plaintiff to do? The opinion’s “men of ordinary prudence and
discretion” function not as models setting the standard for accident-avoidance,
but as jury/blame-assessors.102 Thus, members of the all-male jury are
excused from deciding whether they themselves would have crossed the
causeway. They are told instead, to recall that women are bad drivers, and
decide whether a woman driver should have crossed. To neglect to consider
gender as a factor counting against the plaintiff is deemed inappropriate.
Other courts, however, took a different approach. In Daniels v. Clegg,103
in 1873, as in Fox, the court believed that female sex equated to lack of skill
in driving, but announced that femaleness could excuse lack of skill. Richard
Clegg sued Calvin Daniels to recover the damage to his horse and buggy
when Daniels collided with Clegg’s daughter, who was driving. She was
twenty years old and was driving quite fast, downhill, “being in great haste to

99

29 Conn. 204 at 208.
Id.
101
Id. at 208 - 09.
102
Id. at 208.
103
28 Mich. 32 (1873) (Christiancy, C.J).
100
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find her father on account of the dangerous illness of a sister.”104 After a jury
verdict for Clegg, Daniels appealed, contesting several of the charges to the
jury. The court had charged the jury that:
in deciding whether the plaintiff’s daughter exercised ordinary care in
driving the horse, or was guilty of [contributory] negligence, the jury
should consider the age of the daughter, and the fact that she was a
woman . . . . [S]he would not be guilty of negligence if she used that
degree of care that a person of her age and sex would ordinarily use.105
The trial judge refused the defendant’s requested instruction that “for the
purpose of this case, the daughter should be held to the same degree of care
and skill that would be required of the plaintiff [her father] himself, had he
been driving at the time of the collision.”106
Chief Justice Christiancy of the Michigan Supreme Court approved the
charge as ultimately given, commenting:
No one would ordinarily expect, and the defendant had no right to
expect, from a young woman thus situated, the same amount of
knowledge, skill, dexterity, steadiness of nerve, or coolness of
judgment, in short the same degree of competency, which he would
expect of ordinary men under like circumstances; nor, consequently,
would it be just to hold her to the same high degree of care and skill.
The incompetency indicated by her age or sex,—without evidence (of
which there is none) of any unusual skill or experience on her part,—
was less in degree, it is true, than in the case of a mere child; but the
difference is in degree only, and not in principle.107
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Id. at 34.
Id. at 40.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 42. The court explicitly distinguished an earlier case, also written by Chief
Justice Christiancy. In Lake Shore & M. S. R.R. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274 (1872), Mary Miller
sued the railroad company over the injuries she received when a train hit a wagon in which
she was riding. The wagon was d riven by its owner, a man named Eldridge. The trial court
had given as one of many instructions, a charge that said that Eldridge and Miller could not
recover unless they had used “such care as persons of their situation or condition in life,
would ordinarily exert under like circumstances . . . . [A]ny greater care than this she was not
required to exercise.” Id. at 281. The Michigan Supreme Court strongly disagreed, asking:
105

How are railroad companies, or their engineers o r employes, to know the personal
peculiarities, the infirmities, personal character or station in life, of the hundreds of
persons crossing or approaching their track? . . . And if they do not know, then how
and why shall the company be required to run their road, or regulate their own
conduct, or that of their servants, by such personal peculiarities of strangers, of
which they know nothing? These questions suggest their own answers.
Id. at 280. This case does not on its face seem to be about gender at all. Nonetheless, Chief
Justice Christiancy himself must have thought that gender was implicated in Miller, or there
would have been no need to distinguish it in Daniels v. Clegg.
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Again, the injured female, at age twenty, a legal minor, is like a child; but this
time she wins her suit rather than loses by that fact.
Tort law could have responded to perceptions of feminine incompetence
with an onerous doctrinal rule that women committed contributory negligence
as a matter of law simply by driving. This would have been enforcement of
separate spheres ideology with a vengeance. But I was able to find just one
case where such an approach was even urged. In Cobb v. Standish,108 a Maine
case decided in 1837, well before any other case my research for this Article
uncovered, the plaintiff-husband sought damages for the death of a wagonhorse, which died after falling into a mud pit that looked like a watering hole
by the side of the road. The plaintiff’s wife had been driving the wagon, and
the defendant town argued that “trusting a horse to be driven by a woman was
conclusive evidence of want of ordinary care, which would go to excuse the
defendants.”109 The trial judge overruled the objection, and instructed the
jury,
that they should determine upon the evidence, in connection with their
knowledge of the common practice in the country of trusting women to
drive horses, whether they were satisfied, that the plaintiff in thus
trusting his wife with the care of his horse had conducted with that
want of ordinary care, which would go to excuse the defendants.110
The appellate court upheld this instruction, and the plaintiff’s verdict,
commenting, “There is no doubt but a woman may be permitted to drive a
well broken horse, without any violation of common prudence.”111
And other cases refused more expansively to accept any notion that
women and men made up different communities of drivers, whose conduct
tort law should acknowledge as categorically different. In Tucker v.
Henniker,112 the New Hampshire Supreme Court insisted that women were
part of a bi-gender community of drivers by reference to which the ordinary
standard of care was set. The plaintiff, injured while driving a horse and
carriage, sued the town, arguing that defects in the repair of the road caused
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14 Me. 198 (1837).
Id. at 199.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 200.
112
41 N.H. 317 (1860).
109
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her accident. The town, in turn, argued that she had been contributorially
negligent. In the trial court, the jury had been instructed that the plaintiff was
“bound to exercise ordinary care, skill and prudence in managing [her] horse,
such care, skill and prudence as ordinary persons like herself were
accustomed to exercise in managing their horses.”113
The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the plaintiff’s verdict and
remanded for a new trial, holding that the jury might have been misled into
thinking from the phrase “ordinary persons like herself” that the plaintiff was
to be held to a standard of care set by comparison to women, rather than the
entire community. The court explained:
In a country where women are accustomed, as among us, to drive
horses and carriages, there can be no doubt that the degree of care, skill
and prudence required of a woman in managing her horse would be
precisely that degree of care, skill and prudence which persons of
common prudence, or mankind in general, usually exercise, or are
accustomed to exert, in the management of the horses driven by them.
Now the language of the charge in the court below might be construed
as making the average care, skill and prudence of women in managing
horses, instead of the average care, skill and prudence of mankind
generally, including all those accustomed to manage horses, whether
men or women, boys or girls, the standard by which to determine
whether or not the plaintiff had been guilty of any unskillfulness or
want of care in the management of her horse at the time of the accident.
As it may be doubtful whether this average would be higher or lower
than that of mankind in general, and as it is not the precise standard
prescribed by the law, and the jury may possibly have been misled by
it, the instructions must be held to have been erroneous on this point.114
113

Id. at 319.
Id. at 321 - 22. Compare City of Bloomington v. Perdue, 99 Ill. 329 (1881), in which
the court upheld a jury verdict for a female pedestrian injured because of an unsafe sidewalk,
over defendants’ claim that the trial court’s instructions tended to make the standard of care
for the plaintiff “what ordinary young ladies would do.” Id. at 333. The court replied that the
standard of care charged had been the conduct of “an ordinarily prudent person,” and of “a
woman of common or ordinary prudence,” and upheld the verdict. Id. That is, the court
emphasized that not gender but prudence was at issue; a trial court’s use of the feminine in a
charge did not overwhelm what the Supreme Court considered the ungendered sense of the
charge. By negative implication, the reviewing court thus indicated that had gender been
emphasized sufficiently to compel a conclusion that the jury was instructed to apply a
“prudent woman” standard, the charge would have been legally erroneous.
The appellate analysis in both Tucker and City of Bloomington underscores the
ambiguousness of the language of gender, highlighting that the words “person,” “man,” and
“woman,” have multiple meanings. In Tucker, the court could have construed use of the word
“person” to indicate to the jury that the p laintiff’s sex was irrelevant. Instead, the court thought
that the word person, in the phrase “person like herself,” served not to connote gender
neutrality, but as a placeholder for gender to be filled in, conceptually, according to the sex of
the plaintiff. Conversely, in City of Bloomington, the court read the word “woman” not to
mean that femaleness was relevant, but simply to indicate that the relevant actor was female,
though her gender did not matter. The word “man,” too, has multiple meanings. M an can
mean that maleness is relevant, or that the relevant actor is male, though it doesn’t matter; man
can even, especially in older times, be intended to include women. See Eichorn v. Missouri, K.
& T. Ry., 32 S.W. 993 (Mo. 1895), discussed infra notes 226 - 232 and accompanying text.
114
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Although the court in Tucker purported to be imposing a strict rule of
gender neutrality, it seems unlikely that a similar reference to “ordinary
persons like himself” would have seemed erroneously gender-specific to the
court. Like those in other jurisdictions, New Hampshire courts commonly
used masculine language in tort cases, referring, for example, to “men of
ordinary care and prudence.”115 And while the Tucker court claimed “doubt”
as to whether prudent women were more or less careful than prudent men, the
court must have believed it at least likely that the comparison benefited the
plaintiff, not the defendant, because it reversed a plaintiff’s verdict.
Gender also could enter the analysis when courts assessed the duty of a
defendant towards a female driver. For example, in a 1906 California case,
the appellate court upheld a jury verdict for the plaintiff, who was injured
when the buggy she was riding in hit a train. The buggy was driven by her
sister-in-law. The court held the jury justified in finding the railroad
negligent, when its engineer failed to stop or even slow the train for some time
after he “saw that the driver (a woman) could not manage the horse.”116 The
idea that those operating cars or trains should pay extra care when
approaching women driving horse-led vehicles was apparently widespread.
For example, a 1911 Minnesota statute required car drivers passing anyone
with a horse to stop if requested or signaled, and to cut the motor if the horse
appeared “badly frightened” or upon request.117 The statute imposed even
greater duties on car drivers “upon meeting or overtaking any horse, or other
draft animal, driven or in charge of a woman, child or aged person.”118 In
those circumstances, the driver was required to slow the speed of the car to
four miles per hour, and to stop the car, even without request, if the draft
animal exhibited “any signs of fright.”119

115
Cofran v. Sanbornton, 56 N.H. 12, 13 (1875) (Smith, J.); see also, e.g. Gordon v.
Boston & M. R.R., 58 N.H. 396, 397 (1878) (referencing “men of ordinary skill, prudence,
and diligence” in jury charge).
116
Johnson v. Center, 88 P. 727, 728 (Cal. App. 1906).
117
Act of April 20, 1911, ch. 365, § 13, 1911 Minn. Laws 498.
118
Act of April 20, 1911, ch. 365, § 15, 1911 Minn. Laws 499.
119
Id.
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Although the law just discussed offered these varied analyses of gender’s
impact in women-drivers cases, judges in such cases did not invariably
address gender at all. This was probably not because late-nineteenth century
courts failed to consider the possibility of discussing gender in these
circumstances. The cases discussed above were well known and frequently
listed in treatises,120 so the gender issues they raised were familiar to
contemporaries. However, the cases’ analyses of gender were rarely cited in
other opinions. For example, Daniels was a well known case, cited by courts
around the country over thirty times, according to Shepard’s Citations.
Though it was sometimes cited by early tort treatises121 and frequently offered
by modern scholars122 to substantiate their point that women were treated as
childlike by the common law, Daniels was not, in fact, relied on for that
proposition by contemporary courts.123 Daniels was cited frequently by courts
for its rule relating to the contributory negligence of children — that the jury
should take into account their age and sex — but only once for the proposition
that women should be expected to have less driving skill than men. 124
120

See, e.g., CHARLES FISK BEACH , JR., A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE § 260, 391 (John J. Crawford ed., 3d ed. 1899); 1 T HOMPSON ON NEGLIGENCE ,
supra note 21, at § 339, 319 - 20.
121
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 120.
122
See, e.g., Collins, supra note 12, at 316 - 17; Forell, Essentialism, supra note 15, at 775
n.32.
123
See Winter v. Harris, 49 A. 398, 399 (R.I. 1901). Winter discussed an accident
involving a buggy driven by the female plaintiff. Even though it cited, and therefore had
demonstrably read Daniels, the Rhode Island Supreme Court did not discuss gender in its
opinion.
124
See Michigan Cent. Ry. v. Hassenyer, 12 N.W. 155, 157 (Mich. 1882) (Cooley, J.), a
case involving a (minor) female pedestrian killed by a train that cited Daniels for its genderrelated rule. In Hassenyer, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict for the
plaintiff because the jury had been charged that the law did not require the same degree of
care and prudence in a woman as in a man. If anything, Justice Cooley commented, the
opposite ought to be the rule:
if we judge of ordinary care by the standard of what is commonly looked for and
expected, we should probably agree that a woman would be likely to be more
prudent, careful and particular in many positions and in the performance of many
duties than a man would. . . . In many . . . cases a woman’s natural timidity and
inexperience with dangers inclines her to be more cautious; and if we naturally and
reasonably look for greater caution in the woman than in the man, any rule of law
that demands less must be unphilosophical and unreasonable.
Id. at 157. Justice Cooley noted that use of the word “woman” did not invariably signify
judicial intent to instruct the jury that gender difference might be relevant: “[W]hen the actor is
a woman, an instruction that she is bound to observe the conduct of a woman of common and
ordinary prudence, cannot be held legally erroneous because of being thus special.” Id. But he
cautioned that “the legal requirement is only the observance of ordinary care; and . . . in laying
down rules that are of general application, it is no doubt better to employ general terms, lest
they be supposed applicable to particular classes only.” Id. The linguistic possibilities of
gender-specific and gender-neutral language are discussed briefly supra note 114. As with
Daniels, treatises, but not caselaw, cited Hassenyer for its treatment of g ender.
It is interesting to note that Justice Cooley was quicker in other circumstances to allow
judicial recognition of gender difference. See Cartwright v. Chicago & G.T. Ry., 18 N.W. 380,
381 (Mich. 1886) (Cooley, C.J.) (upholding plaintiff’s jury verdict where female passenger was
injured getting out of the train at the rear, rather than the front; “[W]e think a woman is
excusable for not desiring to pass through the smoking car, and she has a right to assume it is
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Similarly, courts frequently cited Tucker v. Henniker for other propositions,
but rarely for its analysis of gender.125 Perhaps the courts that did not discuss
gender in these circumstances believed women to be as capable as men at
driving, or perhaps they believed any incapability inappropriately recognized
by the tort system, or perhaps they thought the issue not properly raised
without proffered evidence. There is no way to know.
Moreover, as the twentieth century progressed, judges deciding womandriver cases stopped addressing gender, whether the woman was driving a car
or a horse-drawn vehicle.126 Again, and for the same reasons, I think it likely
that this was not a case of unconscious erasure of gender, but rather a decision
not to include it expressly in the analysis. To add to the speculations proposed
above, it may be that although the assumption of lesser feminine competence
lasted well into the modern era, that assumption had carried particular weight
for women driving horse-drawn vehicles.127 Or perhaps the factual predicate
of the cases became less frequent because many fewer women drove early
cars, which were difficult and dirty to start,128 than had driven horse-drawn
vehicles. Whatever the reason, I found just one case involving a woman
automobile driver that expressly addressed gender after 1906, a 1923 New

not expected of her.”).
125
See, e.g., Winship v. Enfield, 42 N.H. 197, 213 (1860); Clifford v. Tyman, 61 N.H. 508
(1881). Both cases cite Tucker only for propositions unrelated to gender, though both involve
female drivers.
126
I was able to uncover the following late 19th- and early 20th-century cases dealing with
accidents involving women drivers of both cars and horse-drawn vehicles, in which the
reported opinion did not mention gender: McCray v. Sharpe, 66 So. 441 (Ala. 1914) (female
driver of buggy sues male car driver); Finkle v. Tait, 203 P. 1031 (Cal. App. 1921); Golden
Eagle Dry Goods v. Mockbee, 189 P. 850 (Colo. 1920); St. Mary’s Academy of Sisters of
Loretto of City of Denver v. Newhagen, 238 P. 21 (Colo. 1925); Opp v. Pryor, 128 N.E. 580
(Ill. 1920); Tisdale v. Town of Bridgewater, 45 N.E. 730 (Mass. 1897); Carson v. Turrish, 168
N.W. 349 (Minn. 1918); Johnson v. St. Paul City Ry., 69 N.W. 900 (Minn. 1897); Carero v.
Breslin, 128 A. 883 (N.J. 1925) (two-car collision involving two women drivers); Peters v.
Cuneo, 108 N.Y.S. 264 (App. Div. 1908); Williams v. Board of Trustees, 205 N.Y.S. 742
(App. Div. 1924) (female driver of horse-drawn school wagon “capable of doing a man’s
work”); Winter v. Harris, 49 A. 398, 399 (R.I. 1901). In addition, in none of the cases
discussed above at text accompanying notes -, dealing with women driving their husbands’
cars, do courts talk about any impact of gender on the standard of care for the driver.
127
See Michael Berger, Women Drivers: The Emergence of Folklore and Stereotypic
Opinion Concerning Feminine Automotive Behavior, 9 W OMEN ’S STUD. INT’L FORUM 257,
258 (1986)(arguing that stereotype of women as bad drivers did not emerge until twenty or
thirty years after invention of the automobile).
128
SCHARFF, supra note 30, at 15.
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York case brought by a husband for the wrongful death of his wife in a car
accident caused by negligent upkeep of the roads. A New York appellate
court commented that the husband “is entitled to have reasonable care
bestowed upon the road his wife has to travel — a care which has in view the
fact that women and young persons have not that ability to recover themselves
from dangerous situations that seasoned drivers or resourceful men may
have.”129
Where courts did choose to address gender, the range of approaches taken
in the women drivers cases shows, again, that to know that courts considered
gender important in a certain context — even when the reason gender was at
issue was somewhat disrespectful of women’s equality, like an assumption
that women are bad drivers — is to know very little. When women were
injured while they were driving, the category of cases was small enough, and
the doctrinal possibilities wide enough, that the opinions do not yield a
definitive approach. Rather, the cases highlight the pressure points of tort
doctrine’s interaction with gender, and reveal that those pressure points are
not modern inventions.
III. TRAIN CASES
The largest constellation of early personal injury cases in which gender
appears, in text and subtext, arose when women passengers of trains and
streetcars were injured, usually boarding or disembarking. The cases’
preoccupation with gender arises out of several obvious sources of gender
difference relevant to passengers’ ability to avoid accidents. First and
foremost was clothing. During the time examined, women’s physical agility
was impaired by long skirts, corsets,130 and, often, high heels.131 In addition,
between 1850 and 1925, roughly the period here examined, the country had a
far higher birth rate than today;132 women, that is, were pregnant far more of

129

Roberts v. Town of Eaton, 202 N.Y.S. 360, 362 (App. Div. 1923).
See LEE HALL , COMMON T HREADS: A PARADE OF A MERICAN CLOTHING 203 (1992)
(reporting that during the first decades of the 20th century, women still wore corsets, dragging
skirts, and other encumbering clothes); Helene E. Roberts, The Exquisite Slave: The Role of
Clothes in the Making of the Victorian Woman, 2 SIGNS 554, 557 - 58 (1977) (cataloging
fashions and their restrictions on women’s mobility through the nineteenth century); Welke,
Unreasonable Women, supra note 15, at 380 & nn.31 - 34 (citing t hese and other sources).
Skirts imposed risks in contexts other than railroad travel, of course. See, e.g., Hensler v. Stix,
88 S.W. 108 (Mo. 1905) (discussing the injuries that resulted when a young woman’s skirt
was caught in an elevator door).
131
Heels contributed to many accidents involving women. See, e.g., Central of Georgia
Ry. v. Carlisle, 56 So. 737, 739 (Ala. Ct. App. 1911) (per curiam) (describing plaintiff’s
footwear as “new Sunday shoes, with heels that tapered a good d eal down to a point”);
Arkansas Midland Ry. v. Robinson, 130 S.W. 536 (Ark. 1910); Wisdom v. Chicago, R.I. & G.
Ry., 231 S.W. 344, 345 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1921) (plaintiff was wearing “pumps, of a
fashionable make, with heels about three inches high”).
132
UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES: FROM COLONIAL T IMES TO THE PRESENT 49, Series B5 - 10 (1976).
130
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the time than they are now, which created additional risks.133 Furthermore,
Americans in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had a strong sense
of the fragility of female reproductive health. 134 Certainly part of this sense
was based on hard facts, given how little was known about medicine. In any
event, even a constructed sense of fragility must have had real effects on real
women and the ways they learned to behave.
Women’s somewhat constrained mobility was important since trains and
streetcars were difficult to board and disembark. 135 Getting on or off required
stepping up anywhere from fourteen or eighteen inches to three or three-anda-half-feet — a long way, up or down. 136 In a long skirt, often with a train
trailing down to the floor, stepping all that way caused frequent falls — the
clothes were confining,137 a woman might step on her own skirt, or someone
else might step on her, or the skirt might catch on a part of the car.138 In
addition, small children could not manage the step on their own and had to be

133

See West v. St. Louis S. W. Ry., 86 S.W. 140 (Mo. 1905) (“The court instructs the jury
as a matter of law that it is dangerous and unsafe for a lady in a state of pregnancy to jump,
either by assistance or alone, from the end of a flat car, a distance of four or five feet, onto a
hard surface.”); Brodie v. Carolina Midland Ry., 24 S.E. 180 (S.C. 1896) (regarding a plaintiff
who suffered a miscarriage after jumping two -and-a-half to three feet from train step to
ground).
134
The non-judicial sources are countless. In the legal realm, see, most famously, Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (“That woman’s physical structure and the performance
of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious.
This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her.”). In the specific arena
of boarding and disembarking injuries, see, for example, Steketee v. Waters, 159 N.W. 368,
369 (Mich. 1916) (plaintiff had been operated on for “female trouble” and when she was
pulled off a high train step, the operation came undone); Warden v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 35 Mo.
App. 631, 632 (1889) (plaintiff suffered a “uterine hemorrhage” after walking in a bad storm
when the defendant railroad let her off past her station); Madden v. Port Royal & W. C. Ry.,
14 S.E. 713, 713 (S.C. 1892) (plaintiff in delicate health suffered “displacement of her womb”
after jumping from last step on train to ground); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. of Tex. v. Morgan, 108
S.W. 724, 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) (plaintiff was suffering from “womb trouble or womb
disease,” for which she had been recently treated, and suffered a relapse when she was carried
past her station and was forced to stay overnight and walk and ride in the rain to get home).
135
In Judge Posner’s sample of 19th-century tort cases, seven percent of all cases appear
to have been predicated on injuries to train and streetcar passengers boarding and
disembarking. See Posner, supra note 2, at 53 (table 2) (finding that out of 1528 total cases,
65 involved non-collision railroad passenger accidents), 54 (table 3) (identifying 45 cases
involving streetcar passengers injured boarding or disembarking).
136
See, e.g., Toledo, St. L. & K. C. Ry. v. Wingate, 37 N.E. 274, 275 (Ind. 1894) (26
inches from top of platform to lower steps of train); Hager v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 104 A.
599, 599 (Pa. 1918) (three feet from the ground to the train); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Watson, 10
S.W. 731, 731 (Tex. 1889) (30 - 36 inches from the ground to the first step onto the train); San
Antonio & A. P. Ry. v. Wiuvar, 257 S.W. 667, 668 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (14 - 20 inches
from the ground to the train).
137
See Foy v. L. B. & S. C. Ry., 144 Eng. Rep. 429, 430 (C.P. 1865) (discussing
restrictions on movement imposed by women’s clothing).
138
See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Hayne, 95 So. 879, 880 (Ala. 1923) (plaintiff’s dress caught
on something as she boarded the train); Citizens’ St. Ry. v. Shepherd, 62 N.E. 300, 300 (Ind.
App. 1901) (someone stepped on plaintiff’s skirt); Dorcey v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light,
203 N.W. 327, 328 (Wis. 1925) (same).
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carried, often by their mothers.139 Perhaps as important as the length of the
step were the social customs involved. It was quite normal during the time
here examined for passengers to get on a train or streetcar while it was moving
slowly. 140 Sometimes trains or streetcars did not even come to rest at a stop;
they would just slow down and passengers would jump on or off. 141 The
problem for women was that their manner of dress meant that jumping on or
off a train was quite likely to cause injury.
In general, then, women and men were not equally at ease in all the steps
involved in getting on and off trains and streetcars. No wonder, then, that
gender is a prevalent topic in the cases about train-passenger injuries to
women, in which plaintiffs often sought damages for carriers’ creation of risks
that affected women more than men. This Part analyzes the results, as courts
grappled with distinguishing equal from special treatment—a line that
continues to trouble legal decisionmakers.
The cases display a crucial tension. First, courts all-but-universally
agreed that railroads had to go to some lengths to accommodate women’s
physical needs, because accommodation was necessary for women’s access to
mass transportation. Consideration of a female accident victim’s sex could
help her prove a case of negligence because she could argue that the railroad’s
failure to make a particular accommodation was unreasonable, given that
many passengers were female.142 At the same time, courts seemed to have

139
See, e.g., Johnson v. Mahoning & S. Ry. & Light, 60 Pa. Super. 530, 535 (1915)
(plaintiff injured when she fell disembarking from the streetcar with a child in her arms; “[t]he
common and well-known practice of mothers in so acting is an answer to defendant’s” claim
of contributory negligence).
140
See, e.g., Paducah Traction v. Tolar, 171 S.W. 1009, 1011 (Ky. 1915) (“It is true that it
is quite a common and usual thing for passengers to leave [street]cars before they stop and to
get on them before they stop . . . . [but] while the conductor, in the exercise of ordinary care,
might not be required to take notice of the action of a passenger able to take care of himself in
alighting from a car running at a slow rate of speed, it is perfectly obvious that, when a
conductor sees a middle -aged woman in the act of getting off a car running at 10 or 15 miles
an hour, he cannot help but know that it is a most unusual and uncommon thing to do, as well
as extremely dangerous . . . .”); Johnson v. St. Joseph Ry., Light, Heat & Power, 128 S.W.
243, 244 (Mo. App. 1910) (discussing ordinance requiring streetcar conductors to stop their
cars as women or children leave or enter, as effecting change from common law rule); Filer v.
N.Y. Cent. Ry., 49 N.Y. 47, 48 (1872) (plaintiff injured as she exited a slowly moving train
after the conductor refused her request that it stop).
141
See 2 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE § 520, 954 - 61 (5th ed. 1898).
142
In requiring accommodation of women’s reasonable needs, even where such needs
were different from men’s, the announced rule in this area is somewhat analogous to the
“reasonable woma n” standard some propose for modern sexual harassment law. See, e.g.,
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d
611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., dissenting); Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal
Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1398 (1992); George Rutherglen, Sexual Harassment: Ideology or Law?, 18 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL ’Y 487, 495 - 98 (1995); Krista J. Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability
for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 PENN . L. REV. 1461, 1486 - 88 (1986).
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considered it important that accommodation did not slip over an ill-defined
line into special treatment. This reluctance was premised, at least in part, on
judicial recognition that women possessed the complete adult capacity to take
risks and bear the consequences. So, for example, courts found that it would
have been inappropriate to expect railroad personnel to render unsought
assistance in too large a variety of circumstances: requiring railroad
employees to assume that women needed help, even when they did not ask for
it, would have been onerous for the railroads and treated women as less than
full adults. Courts did not even consider treating women as not responsible
enough to merit an inquiry into contributory negligence. Moreover, in
assessing the railroad’s claim of contributory negligence, gender difference
could cut against the plaintiff. Given the difference in women’s and men’s
abilities to negotiate obstacles, just as plaintiffs were entitled to have the jury
instructed to take account of the accident victim’s sex in their determination of
whether the railroad was negligent, the same rule applied against women
seeking damages; the defendant generally could insist that the jury be
informed that it might consider a plaintiff’s age, sex, and physical condition in
determining whether that passenger took an untoward risk.
This Article is not the first to examine these railroad cases. Barbara
Welke has previously discussed many of the cases I analyze in this Part.143
Welke, however, reaches very different conclusions. She finds that “gender,
in the context of accidental personal injury, often freed women from
responsibility for their acknowledged disabilities and imposed responsibility
for taking account of those deficiencies on men (the defendants).”144 But,
Welke argues, the social construction of difference as disability remained.
Even if female tort plaintiffs did not bear the full brunt of their difference in
their individual cases, the presentation of difference itself was oppressive:
“[t]he judgments reached in cases involving women were predicated on a
consistent, uniform, and debilitating picture of women.”145 In sum, “imposing
the obligation of taking account of women’s disabilities on defendants” meant
that “[w]omen are incapable of taking care of themselves, therefore men must
do so.”146
As presented below, I disagree with Welke’s reading of the cases, though
I certainly profited from her research and discussion. I find the cases
characterized by their refusal either to exclude or to infantilize women. In my

143

Welke, Unreasonable Women, supra note 15.
Id. at 402.
145
Id. at 400.
146
Id. at 402.
144
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view, the cases recognized certain differences between men and women, but
did not cast women’s difference as a disability. Far from oppressively
enforcing the assigned feminine character of timidity and weakness, courts
engaged in a quite sensitive and empathetic account of female experience, and
through the lens of common carrier doctrine, used that account in assessing
liability and the right to recover.
A. Duties of the Carriers
1. Common Carrier Doctrine
As common carriers, railroads and streetcars were obligated to serve
everyone capable of self-care.147 The principle of common carriage is ancient,
though scholars disagree about its earliest rationale.148 The earliest of
American civil rights statutes, the 1875 Civil Rights Act, was an attempt to
codify a version of the law of common carriage by requiring not just access,
but access under conditions that did not discriminate on account of race.149
No such statute was passed or needed relating to service for (white) women.
For example, the common law and custom sufficed to induce railroads not
simply to offer accommodation, but accommodation that respected women’s
desire for a decorous and respectable passenger compartment.150
147
A frequently stated rule was that a carrier need not take on a passenger who “because
of extreme youth or old age, or any mental or physical infirmities, is unable to take care of
himself,” unless that passenger brought along “an attendant to take care of him.” Croom v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 53 N.W. 1128, 1129 (Minn. 1893); see also Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry.
v. Sears, 210 S.W. 684, 685 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1919) (“A carrier is not required to accept as
a passenger one without an attendant who is mentally incapable of caring for himself.”).
148
See Joseph W. Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 NW . U. L. REV. 1283 (1996) (surveying cases and scholarly analyses of
justification of common carrier doctrine, and finding scholarly disagreement). The status of
common carrier brought with it other obligations and liabilities, as well. For example, the
common carrier was liable for damage to goods it carried, unless the damage was caused by
an act of God. See Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703); see also Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., Common Carriers and the Common Law, 13 A MER. L. REV. 609 (1879) (tracing
common law development of the rule).
149
The statute, was, of course, overturned by the Supreme Court in The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), as beyond the authority of Congress.
150
See, e.g., Nieto v. Clark, 18 F. Cas. 236, 238 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (“In respect to
female passengers, the contract [of common carriage] . . . includes an implied stipulation that
they shall be protected against obscene conduct, lascivious behavior, and every immodest and
libidinous approach.”); Craker v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 36 Wis. 657, 674 (1875) (“Every
woman has a right to assume that a passenger car is not a brothel; and that when she travels in
it, she will meet nothing, see nothing, hear nothing, to wound her delicacy or insult her
womanhood.”). This rule protected African American as well as white women. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. v. Finn, 16 Ky. L. Rptr. 57, 59 (1894) (upholding jury verdict for black
plaintiff who was assaulted by two white male passengers; “as to female passengers, . . . their
contract of passage embraces an implied stip ulation that the company will protect them
against general obscenity, immodest conduct or wanton approach”). Railroads typically
designated a car for “ladies,” usually including their male escorts. See, e.g, Peck v. N.Y. Cent.
& H. R. R.R., 70 N.Y. 587 (1877). Ladies cars were sometimes available to both black and
white women, but by the 1880s and 1890s, in the South, such cars were usually reserved for
white women. See Minter, supra note 26; Welke, Road to Plessy, supra note 26.
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It was the principle of common carriage that dictated that railroads were
legally required to meet women’s reasonable needs, as much as men’s, in both
trains and stations. A typical statement of this requirement was offered by a
Missouri judge in 1915:
A railroad company does not exercise its franchise as a common
carrier of passengers for the purpose of transporting the young and
healthy and strong only, but for the benefit of all alike . . . . The
plaintiff, notwithstanding her sex, age, and physical condition, had
the right to avail herself, as a passenger, of the facilities offered by
the defendant, and it was its duty to adjust the care given her to these
circumstances, in connection with the necessities arising from the
physical condition of their facilities.151
The principle of common carriage also dictated that other categories of train
riders who were, like women, unable to negotiate certain obstacles to passage
were to receive some extra consideration. An 1867 New York case involving
a nine-year-old boy who was killed when he fell off the outside platform of a
streetcar provides a good example of the way this general doctrine typically
played out. The defendants sought an instruction “that the fact that the
deceased was a child, makes no difference in the application of the rule of law
as to the question of negligence.” But, said the appellate court:
A sick or aged person, a delicate woman, a lame man, or a child, is
entitled to more attention and care from a railroad company than one
in good health and under no disability. They are entitled to more time
in which to get on or off the cars; they are entitled to more
consideration when crossing a street, to the end that the cars shall not
run over them. All these classes are entitled to use the street and to
ride in the cars; and such haste in starting up, or such speed in driving
as would be reasonable care toward others, might well be carelessness
and neglect towards them. 152

151

Walker v. Quincy, O. & K. C. R.R., 178 S.W. 108, 110 (Mo. 1915). The court reversed
a defendant’s verdict, finding error in the jury charge, which included the instruction that the
jury could not base a negligence finding on the absence of a b ox or stool to assist alighting
passengers.
152
Sheridan v. Brooklyn City & N. R.R., 36 N.Y. 39, 42 (1867).
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Though women were often grouped with children and people with disabilities
in discussions like this one, the cases did not actually treat the categories in
the same way. The law governing people with disabilities was that the carrier
had only to accommodate needs known by, or obvious to, its employees, and
that the employees had no duty to anticipate such needs.153 As a Texas
appellate court put it in 1908, “It was not [the railroad employees’] duty to use
ordinary diligence to discover the sick and feeble condition of plaintiff and his
inability to help himself.”154 People with disabilities had to overcome many
difficulties of access155 until passage of the civil rights laws of the 1970s and
later.156 By contrast, as the cases below demonstrate, railroads were required
to accommodate women’s predictable needs more thoroughly.
2. Getting On and Off the Train
The least controversial intersection between common carrier doctrine and
gender was the requirement that railroads had to provide physical facilities
that answered women’s needs on entering or disembarking, or risk a jury

153
“‘[W]here a person is accepted as a passenger who is unable, through physical or
mental disability, to care for himself, and this disability is known or made known to the carrier
at the time of acceptance,’ the carrier is under duty to assist the passenger; ‘but it is not the
carrier’s duty to anticipate such disabilities or needs, nor to be on the lookout for them.’”
Southern Ry. v. Hayne, 95 So. 879, 880 (Ala. 1923) (quoting Central of Georgia Ry. v.
Carlisle, 56 So. 737, 738 (Ala. Ct. App. 1911)).
154
Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Garner, 115 S.W. 273, 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
155
See, e.g., Churchill v. United Fruit, 294 F. 400, 401 (D. Mass. 1923) (“Speaking
generally, common carriers, being obliged to accept as passengers all persons except those
likely to annoy or endanger other passengers, are required to conduct their business with
regard to the general run of travelers, and are not required to make provision for special and
unusual cases” such as persons who are ill.); Young v. Missouri Pac. Ry ., 93 Mo. App. 267
(1902) (overturning a jury verdict for the plaintiff, holding that she had fallen as she alighted
from a train because of a somewhat weak ankle, and that because her need for a step was
therefore unique to her, no grounds existed for a finding that the railroad had been negligent).
At the same time, however, failure to provide individualized assistance (as opposed to a
durable piece of equipment, like a step) was frequently grounds for a plaintiff’s judgment,
when the plaintiff was disabled. See, e.g., Croom v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 53 N.W. 1128,
1129 (Minn. 1893) (“If a passenger, because of extreme youth or old age, or any mental or
physical infirmities, is unable to take care of himself, he ought to be provided with an
attendant t o take care of him. But if the company voluntarily accepts a person as a passenger,
without an attendant, whose inability to care for himself is apparent or made known to its
servants, and renders special care and assistance necessary, the company is negligent if such
assistance is not afforded.”); Rice v. Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power, 141 P. 191, 192
(Wash. 1914) (holding that when a carrier took on an “aged, crippled, [or] otherwise infirm
passenger,” it had to give that person time to be seated b efore starting the car).
156
See Lisa G. Lerman and Annette K. Sanderson, Discrimination in Access to Public
Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 215, 236 - 38, 265 - 69 (1978) (surveying federal and state laws relating to
people with disabilities and public accommodations, up through 1978); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 – 12213 (1998).
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finding of negligence in the event of an accident.157 Accommodation of
women’s typical needs could be achieved by building a platform, which
would shorten the distance from the railroad to the ground, by providing a
step-stool, or by making a porter available. Courts perceived that women’s
safety (though perhaps not men’s) necessitated these requirements.158 So, for
example, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a jury finding of negligence
against a railroad where the platform was over two feet below the lower steps
of the cars, “thus compelling the alighting passengers, even women and
children, to leap from the steps, like chickens from their perches.”159 Indeed,
courts occasionally issued categorical rules, finding negligence as a matter of
law for failure to provide a platform for women. In a 1912 South Carolina
case, in which the plaintiff had suffered a miscarriage after attempting to get
off a train that had stopped before it reached the raised platform, the court
charged the jury as follows:
it is the duty of a railroad company to provide suitable and reasonably
safe places for its passengers to alight from its trains, and to provide a
stool or steps, or other appliances, properly and safely placed so as to
reasonably avoid injury to its passengers alighting from its trains.160
The South Carolina Supreme Court noted that this charge was perhaps too
specific, but, emphasizing the sex of the plaintiff, found that it was not
prejudicial: “It seems to the court that the jury could not have reached, with
reason, any other conclusion than that due care required that the defendant
should furnish a light and stool for women alighting from the train.”161

157
Of course, even after the jury found the carrier negligent, the plaintiff had to defeat the
ever-present charge that she was contributorially negligent before liability would be imposed.
See infra Part III.B.
158
See Young v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 93 Mo. App. 267 (1902) (railroad put steps to help
passengers from each car except the smoking car, which was used only by men).
159
Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R.R. v. Wingate, 37 N.E. 274 (Ind. 1895). The court, however,
reversed a plaintiff’s verdict, finding contributory negligence as a matter of law in plaintiff’s
jump from a moving train.
160
Lancaster v. Southern Ry., 75 S.E. 398, 399 (S.C. 1912).
161
Id.; s ee also Merryman v. Chicago Great Western Ry., 113 N.W. 357, 358 (Iowa 1907)
(“The legal duty imposed is to provide a reasonably safe exit for all passengers, and not [just]
for particular classes of persons [i.e. men.]”).
This type of understanding of women’s needs was the rule, but not the universal one. A
case frequently cited by railroad companies even in this country (though usually distinguished
or disapproved by the courts) was Siner v. Great Western Ry., 3 L.R. - Ex., 150 (1868), in
which Judge Bramwell commented about a very long distance from train to ground: “I see no
evidence that this was a dangerous place. The witnesses say it was dangerous, but . . . I
protest that to ordinarily constituted persons I can see no danger.” Id. at 153. Women, he
s eems to mean, are not ordinarily constituted persons. Siner was soon overruled by the British
courts, in a case involving much the same scenario. See Robson v. North Eastern Ry., 10 L.R.
- Q.B. 271 (1876).
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Other aspects of railroad and streetcar operations relating to getting on and
off the car were similarly required to meet women’s needs as a matter of
course, without special requests by female passengers. In an 1886 Missouri
case, the court held that to decide whether the defendant railroad was
negligent in stopping its car briefly, “the jury are to consider her [the
plaintiff’s] age, sex, and physical condition.”162 Similarly, in an 1858
Pennsylvania case, in which the plaintiff, a woman recovering from serious
illness, was injured attempting to get off a train, the court instructed the jury
that:
How long a train ought to stop at the various stations may depend upon
circumstances . . . . It depends upon the peculiar circumstances of each
particular case; upon the number of passengers to be let out, their age,
sex, and condition. Prudence and duty would require of a conductor to
detain a train longer to pass out fifty aged females, than five active
men. 163
Of course, there were outliers to these mandates to accommodate women. 164
But almost all the cases I read held that it was negligent not to make it easier
for all healthy women to get on and off trains and streetcars, acknowledging
that women as a rule needed something to bridge a two or three foot gap
between the train and the ground, and needed a longer interval to disembark
than did men.
Even when a woman’s inability to disembark safely was due to special
“delicacy,” often code in these cases for pregnancy, courts often held that
common carriers had to anticipate the needs of such passengers, and conduct
their ordinary operations accordingly — even without notice that there was a
“delicate” passenger present.165 For example, in an 1892 South Carolina case,
162
Hickman v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 4 S.W. 127, 128 (Mo. 1886). See also Morrison v.
Charlotte Elec. Ry. Light & Power, 31 S.E. 720, 721 (N.C. 1898) (“even if it be admitted that
10 or 12 seconds is sufficient time to allow a woman to get off the car . . . “).
163
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Kilgore, 32 Pa. 292, 293 (1858).
164
For example, in a 1902 Missouri case already cited, Young v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 93
Mo. App. 267 (1902), the plaintiff was a 38-year-old woman traveling with her baby. When
she got out of the train car, she was told to go to the next car — the smoker, typically for men
only — and exit from there to the platform. Unlike at all the other cars, the railroad had not
placed a portable step at the exit from the smoker. When the plaintiff disembarked, she fell
and broke her ankle. The court overturned a jury verdict in her favor, holding that she fell
because of a somewhat weak ankle, and that her need for a step was therefore unique to her.
The court stated that she should have given her baby to someone to hold, and taken hold of a
rail as she stepped carefully down. It failed to draw the fairly obvious conclusion that in
putting steps outside all t he cars where women normally would be, the railroad had itself
acknowledged that more women needed steps than just those with weak ankles.
165
This requirement that the railroads anticipate that some passengers might be pregnant
differentiated the treatment of pregnant women – and women, more generally – from the
treatment of persons with disabilities. See supra notes 153-156 and accompanying text. My
reading of the cases is that courts in this era did not engage in the more modern pretense that
pregnancy is a characteristic unrelated to sex. Cf. General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976) (holding discrimination again st pregnant women not actionable sex discrimination
under Title VII); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (discrimination against pregnant
women not actionable sex discrimination under Equal Protection Clause).
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the complaint alleged that the plaintiff, “a lady in delicate health,” suffered
“the displacement of her womb,” when compelled to jump down from a train,
after it passed the stopping place and no footstool was provided. 166 The
appellate court held that the trial court properly rejected defendant’s claim
that, as a matter of law, there was no negligence under these facts; the height
of the step, absence of a stool, and delicate health of the plaintiff could
combine to support a jury’s finding of negligence.167
In addition, when a female passenger affirmatively requested assistance in
boarding or disembarking, courts found almost universally that failure to
provide such a service could be negligence. Thus trains needed to have
porters or other employees available to provide requested assistance.168 A
1903 Texas case is typical. 169 The plaintiff was injured getting off a train
while she held a valise in one hand and a child in the other. The step was two
feet; usually there was a stool, but not this time. She had asked for help, but

166

Madden v. Port Royal & W. C. Ry., 14 S.E. 713, 713 (S.C. 1892).
Id. at 714; s ee also St. Louis S. W. Ry. of Tex. v. Ferguson, 64 S.W. 797, 798 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1901) (Conner, C.J.) (surveying case law on pregnant passengers). If “delicate”
women particularly needed a footstool, railroads would try to argue that women who were not
especially delicate did not need one. In Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. v. Bell, 74 S.W. 700
(Ky. Ct. App. 1903), the railroad made a variation on this argument, a rguing that black
women were less deserving of helpful treatment than were white women. The court, however,
rejected the railroad’s submission that though footstools were required for accommodation of
white passengers, they were not necessary for the safe ty of black passengers. See also St.
Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Briggs, 113 S.W. 644 (Ark. 1908) (refusing to reverse jury verdict for
African American plaintiff injured while getting off train, over claim of defendant that the trial
court should have allowed defense counsel to argue that “the real cause of action was the fact
that the negro coach passed the depot while the white coach was stopped at the depot
platform,” because the “evident purpose [of this line of argument] was to stir up race prejudice
and to hold up appellee to ridicule before the jury”). But cf. Frances D. Gage, Reminiscences,
in 1 HISTORY OF W OMAN SUFFRAGE 115, 116 (Elizabeth C. Stanton et al. eds, 2d ed. 1889)
(“That man over there says women need to be helped into carriages, and lifted over ditches,
and to have the best place everywhere. Nobody ever helps me into carriages, or over mudpuddles, or gives me any best place! And ain’t I a woman?” (quoting Sojourner Truth’s
“Ain’t I a Woman” speech at the 1851 Women’s Rights Convention)).
168
This is not to say that no court ever held that a request for assistance off the train could
be refused. I did find one such case, in 1919, in which the Alabama Supreme Court reversed a
plaintiff’s verdict. The court held that the complaint did not adequately allege conditions that
would have imposed a duty on the railroad to assist the plaintiff, even on her request; thus, the
conductor’s refusal to help her was not negligence. The opinion also set down a categorical
rule for when a footstool would be required, holding, as a matter of law, that there was a duty
to have a footstool for train passengers only when there was a step over three feet high, and
commenting that a step of less distance was no higher than that required to board other
vehicles (like buses) that never offered footstools. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Farmer, 79
So. 35, 36 (Ala. 1918).
169
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. of Tex. v. Buchanan, 72 S.W. 96 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
167
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the porter never arrived. The jury awarded her $2500, and the appellate court
upheld the verdict against an appeal claiming insufficient evidence, as a
matter of law, to support the finding of negligence. The reviewing court
stated as the rule that carriers need not ordinarily provide personal assistance,
but found that where such aid was requested, and where the step was too high
for the plaintiff to disembark safely, failure to grant the request could
constitute negligence.170
Like the need for a platform or for a long pause at boarding or
disembarking, the possible need for personal assistance getting on or off a
train was considered a feminine one. This is evident from the occasional suit
by a male accident victim. For example, in one 1916 Texas case,171 the
plaintiff was one of several adult male passengers in the white passenger car
of a train. There were no women or children in the car. He slipped, possibly
on a banana peel. The jury was charged that it could find negligence if the
train company should have taken care of the banana peel, or based on the
railroad’s failure to have an attendant and step stool at the door. There was a
$20,000 verdict,172 which was reversed by the appellate court. The decision
distinguished each case cited in favor of the proposition that an attendant
should be available to assist passengers, and commented:

170

Id. at 97.
Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. v. Yantis, 185 S.W. 969 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) (Conner, C.J.).
172
I do not know the explanation for this extraordinarily high jury award, which I believe
was larger than any other award in a case discussed in t his Article. I have not made a study of
the impact of the sex of the victim on tort compensation, and extended discussion of how
gender influenced tort damages is beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, I can venture
a few background comments. First, the black letter law of tort damages was often sex
specific. For example, an accident victim’s husband, but not wife, could get damages for loss
of consortium. See, e.g., FOWLER V. HARPER, A T REATISE ON THE LAW OF T ORTS 565 (1933).
In addition, it must have been that early tort laws’ focus on lost earnings, rather than lost noneconomic capacity, led to greater damages for injuries to men than for injuries to women,
given women’s lesser wage earnings. On the opposite front, it may be that women were
compensated at a higher level, if men were compensated at all, for certain types of emotional
injuries. See cases cited supra note 150 (regarding tort suits for sexual advances and assaults
on common carriers). Cf. Martha Chamallas and Linda Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the
Law of Fright: A History, 88 M ICH . L. REV. 814 (1990) (discussing modern cases allowing
compensation to mothers who witness injuries to their children). It would be interesting, but
difficult, to examine compensation not related to wage-earning capacity to see if men and
women received comparable damage awards for similar injuries. For discussion of some of
the modern issues relating to gender and tort damages, see Chamallas, Questioning Data,
supra note 15 (arguing that use of race- and gender-specific data to predict likely future wages
for purposes of calculating tort damages violates the Equal Protection Clause); Lucinda
Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform for Women, 64 T ENN . L. REV. 847
(1997); Elaine Gibson, Identifying Gender Bias in Personal Injury Compensation, in
INVESTIGATING GENDER BIAS: LAW COURTS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 87 - 96 (Joan
Brockman & Dorothy E. Chunn eds., 1993); Jane Goodman et al., Money, Sex, and Death:
Gender Bias in Wrongful Death Damage Awards, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 263 (1991) (examining
statistical and jury simulation evidence).
171
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We know of no case which goes so far as to hold that where the
passenger is an adult male, in full health, and the platform, car, and
steps are clear of obstructions and without defect, and where, as shown
in this case, the distance from the lower step of the car to the depot
platform is but 18 inches, that it is incumbent upon the carrier of
passengers to have an attendant to assist him in alighting. As it seems
to us, under such circumstances, the carrier has the right to assume that
the passenger will exercise that degree of care required of him for his
own safety, and that a passenger of the character indicated, so acting,
will be able to safely alight without assistance.173
In a case some years earlier about injuries to a woman, the same judge was
remarkably more sympathetic about a claimed need for assistance in
disembarking. 174 In that case, the court focused on a claim of contributory
negligence in reviewing a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff $6000 for injury
his wife incurred in disembarking from a train while carrying a bag weighing
sixty pounds. The defendants argued that it was contributory negligence as a
matter of law for the plaintiff to attempt to get down the stairs with her arms
full. The court disagreed, noting that she was in good health, and was strong
enough to carry the bag.
It seems to be extending the doctrine of contributory negligence to
great lengths to say that the issue is raised by the mere fact that a
passenger on a railway train concludes to take his or her grip along at
the time of leaving rather than leave it behind . . . . Had appellant’s
porter been there to assist her, as it was his duty to do [according to his
own testimony], it is unlikely that the grip would have contributed to
her injury. 175
It might seem that the difference between what assistance courts found
was owed to women and what to men is not unlike the difference between
what protections the Supreme Court held Congress could legislate for women
workers and what for men. 176 But the courts discussing assistance in alighting
for women did not engage in the rhetoric of control that the Supreme Court
used in Muller v. Oregon to justify upholding protective legislation for
women, but not men. In that case, Justice Brewer wrote: “[H]istory discloses
the fact that woman has always been dependent upon man. He established his

173

Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. v. Yantis, 185 S.W. 969, 972 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) (Conner,

C.J.).
174

Chicago, R. I. & T. Ry. v. Armes, 74 S.W. 77 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903) (Conner, C.J.).
Id. at 79.
176
See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
175
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control at the outset by superior physical strength, and this control in various
forms, with diminishing intensity, has continued to the present. . . . It is
impossible to close one’s eyes to the fact that she still looks to her brother and
depends upon him.”177 The judicial rhetoric justifying a rule requiring certain
types of assistance for women simply did not use this kind of subordinating
rhetoric.
Moreover, courts drew careful doctrinal lines about what kinds of
accommodations trains and streetcars had to offer women, and what kinds
they did not — lines that a Muller type analysis would not have supported.
For example, although courts consistently held that assistance had to be
available to answer women’s request for help, they rejected the categorical
rule that all women had to be offered assistance. A contemporary A.L.R.
annotation stated in summary that “the rule is universal that ordinarily there is
no duty to assist passengers from the train.”178 Typical was a 1916 Wisconsin
case179 in which the court dismissed a jury verdict for the plaintiff on the
grounds that there had been no negligence contributing to her severe fall in
attempting to disembark from a train. She had not requested assistance, and
the court commented: “Plaintiff was a woman about 46 years of age, in good
health, and burdened with only a light hand bag when she fell, and the car was
standing still at a terminal station. Under such circumstances no duty
devolved upon defendants to assist her in alighting.”180
177

Id. at 421 - 22.
Annotation, Duty and Liability of Carrier as to Assisting Passenger to Board or Alight
from Car or Train, 55 A.L.R. 389, 389 (1928). The rule that it was not n egligence to fail to
offer assistance to every woman passenger frequently prevailed notwithstanding railroads’
work rules that porters and conductors should volunteer such assistance to women getting off
a train. In the leading case of Central of Georgia Ry. v. Carlisle, 56 So. 737, 738 (Ala. Ct.
App. 1911) (per curiam), for example, the court held that “the duty [to assist women
passengers, contained in the defendant’s written work rules] was gratuitously assumed, and,
unless known to and relied upon by s uch a passenger to her hurt, nonconformity thereto by its
agents would impose no liability on the carrier.”
179
Gardner v. Chicago & M. Elec. Ry., 159 N.W. 1066 (Wis. 1916).
180
Id. at 1067; see also Indianapolis Traction & Terminal v. Pressell, 77 N.E. 357 (Ind.
App. 1906) (reversing a plaintiff’s verdict, and holding that streetcar conductor had no duty to
volunteer to help her get out, despite a three-foot step); Dorcey v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. &
Light, 203 N.W. 327, 328 (Wis. 1925) (“There was nothing in the circumstances of this case
to lead the conductor . . . to suppose that the plaintiff was in need of help in alighting from the
car. She was a strong, vigorous, able -bodied woman, and it was quite apparent that her
injuries, though painful and serious, are the result of unavoidable accident.”).
It seems likely that judicial insistence that able -bodied women could not expect an
affirmative offer of help was, at least sometimes, imbued with ideas a bout class-appropriate
behavior. In Louisville & N. R.R. v. King, 73 So. 456 (Ala. 1916), for example, the court
commented that:
178

Plaintiff was young and able -bodied; she had been accustomed to labor of a sort that
necessarily implied at least the usual s trength of women of her age; she did the work
of her household; she did the cooking and washing, and she helped her husband in
the field. There was nothing to put her in the class of the aged, the very young,
infirm, or helpless passengers, to whom railro ad companies are under obligation to
furnish aid in getting on or alighting from trains. . . . We have been unable to find in
the evidence any indication that she was not as able as the ordinary passenger.
Id. at 456 - 57. The court in this case seems to have decided to make its own credibility
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Unrequested personal assistance on or off trains would have been
somewhat intrusive for women and quite burdensome for railroads, and given
the rule that railroads had to meet any actual request by a woman for help
alighting or boarding, courts were unwilling to adopt or ratify a sexcategorical rule that women had to be offered such assistance. Instead, most
courts agreed, railroads had an affirmative obligation to offer assistance only
where they had notice of a passenger’s special need for it.
The courts held, however, that notice could be implied by the obviousness
of the need. One circumstance where the need might be obvious was when a
plaintiff — male or female — was obviously disabled in some way. 181 Thus,
in 1911, the leading case of Central of Georgia Ry. v. Carlisle held that there
was no duty to volunteer personal assistance to passengers, unless there is
“physical or mental disability,” combined with notice of the disability to the
railroad. 182
The court insisted, however, that a healthy and only mildly
encumbered woman did not fit its criteria: “the condition of the plaintiff when
she sought to alight was not one of obvious infirmity or disability, although
she was carrying ‘a valise, a parasol, and a fan’.”183
At the same time, however, circumstances frequently could create an
affirmative duty to render assistance even to healthy persons, particularly in

determinations, an unusual event (though less so 80 years ago than now). The opinion noted
that “[s]ome of her neighbors made affidavits to the effect that in the meantime she seemed to
enjoy her usual health and strength, did her usual work, helped her husband cultivate his crop,
picked cotton, and ‘toted’ her 17 months old baby around the neighborhood” and continued
further to say that the jury’s award of $3000 would have been excessive, even if it had not been
otherwise in error. Id. at 457; see also San Antonio R.R. v. Wiuvar, 207 S.W. 667, 669 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924) (describing a Mexican plaintiff as a “strong healthy female”).
181
Both men and women could be disabled, for purposes of this rule. See, e.g., Croom v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 53 N.W. 1128 (Minn. 1893) (affirming jury finding that defendant
railroad was negligent in failing to assist infirm male passenger onto train). Women’s
“disabilities” might in some circumstances b e gender-related, because of the already-discussed
fragility of women’s reproductive health in the period of this paper. See, e.g., Steketee v.
Waters, 159 N.W. 368, 370 (Mich. 1916) (holding that the duty owed a woman who had
received an operation for “female trouble” was the “degree of care” owed a “sick, aged, or
otherwise infirm passenger”).
182
56 So. 737, 738 (Ala. Ct. App. 1911) (per curiam).
183
Id.; s ee also, e.g. Dickinson v. Tucker, 176 P. 949, 951 (Okla. 1918) (Reversing jury
verdict for female plaintiff injured as she disembarked from train while carrying a large piece
of luggage, and holding that duty to assist railway passengers exists only “in the case of a sick,
old, or infirm passenger, or one making request for assistance.”).
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two situations: a hidden hazard, or an obvious burden. Here, courts
recognized that women were more likely than men to be hampered by such
circumstances, and to need assistance—and courts upheld jury charges and
verdicts that required railroads to conduct themselves accordingly. Typical
was a Texas case in 1907 in which the defendant streetcar company appealed
a jury verdict of $3500 for the plaintiff, complaining that the trial judge’s
instructions allowed the jury to find negligence in the conductor’s failure to
help the plaintiff off, “the undisputed evidence being that she was a young,
strong, robust, and active woman.” 184 The trial court upheld the instruction,
commenting that while there is no duty to assist a fit passenger in ordinary
circumstances, here, where the steps were dangerous (covered with mud and
very slippery), such a duty might arise:
The error which, it seems to us, counsel have fallen into, is the idea that
such a duty can arise only in the case of a crippled or infirm passenger
or one incumbered with a load, and that, if the passenger is physically
sound and unincumbered, there can be no situation in which a duty
devolves on the carrier to take precautions for his or her safety in
alighting.185
Although the court did not discuss gender in this passage, the defendant’s
argument revealed the importance of gender in the case. The defendant
argued that the jury charge required it to assist women who did not need
assistance; it had tried unsuccessfully at trial to introduce testimony that one
witness “had repeatedly seen women get on and off cars without assistance,
and that in his opinion there was no necessity in assisting one who was not old
or infirm or did not have bundles, babies, or something of the kind
carrying.”186
Similarly, in a 1911 North Carolina case,187 the plaintiff, a fifty-eight-yearold woman, broke her hip getting off a streetcar; the car had stopped on a hill,
making the step down very long. The appellate court upheld a plaintiff’s
judgment over a challenge to the jury charge on negligence, restating the rule
of the instruction as “[w]hether, in view of all the evidence, a reasonably
prudent man would have allowed the plaintiff, incumbered with the skirts of
her sex, to get off a car of that height without assistance, at a place where the
ground was steeply sloping,” and holding that the issue, so stated, was
properly left for the jury. 188 And in a 1927 Alabama case, the court held that

184

San Antonio Traction Co. v. Flory, 100 S.W. 200, 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907).
Id. at 201.
186
Id. at 201 - 02.
187
Morarity v. Durham Traction Co., 70 S.E. 938 (N.C. 1911).
188
Id. at 939.
185
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“[t]he care of a baby in arms presents a case well within the generally
prevailing doctrine that where personal assistance is seen to be needed, duty
demands it should be rendered . . . . The right of the lady passenger to travel
with her baby is unquestioned.”189 Thus, although the sex of a woman
passenger, alone, was not a special circumstance that made an offer of
assistance necessary, gender weighed in favor of a finding of negligence
based on a defendant’s failure to offer, and could combine with other
circumstances (sometimes, like care of a baby, themselves related to gender)
to impose the duty.
In the cases and circumstances discussed in this section, in which railroads
were frequently found negligent based on their failure to provide an injurypreventing accommodation to a female passenger, it is easy to see how men
and women might be differently situated. Women’s clothing, reproductive
health, etc. — all the factors of gender difference discussed above 190 — were,
generally speaking, obviously connected to the needs and injuries described in
the cases. And the cases demonstrate that underlying courts’ general
willingness to require railroads to accommodate women’s needs were those
courts’ assessments of which types of accommodations of gender difference
were necessary for reasonable access.
3. Personal Assistance beyond Help Boarding and Disembarking
Other requested accommodations were more onerous for railroads, and
less tied to obvious gender difference. Help waking up for the stop, gathering
parcels, getting to the train door — all these were the subject of suits by

189

Southern Ry. v. Laxson, 114 So. 290, 292 (Ala. 1927). The court in Laxson fit its rule
within the category of “disability,” noting just before the passage quoted in text, “[d]isability
need not arise from p hysical or mental infirmity alone.” Id. But see Illinois Cent. R.R. v.
Cruse, 96 S.W. 821, 823 (Ky. 1906):
All assistance that a conductor may extend to ladies without escorts, or with children,
or to persons who are sick and ask his assistance in getting on and off trains, is
purely a matter of courtesy, and not at all incumbent upon him in the line of his
public duty. . . .
The plaintiff fell because her hands were occupied in holding her sleeping child and
the valise. . . . Obviously, it is not incumbent of the employés of a carrier of
passengers, on their own initiative, to render any special service to one or more
passengers to the exclusion of others; their whole duty being to secure the safety and
comfort of all. It certainly is not their duty to be on the lookout to discover that any
particular passenger needs special assistance.
In its careful attention to the facts, this opinion was typical.
But in its legal holding, it was an outlier.
190
See supra text accompanying notes 130 - 141.
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women who claimed damages for injuries from failure of trains to give help of
his kind, when it was requested. But when a plaintiff’s case was premised on
a railroad’s failure to meet one of these types of requests, appellate courts
almost always described such requests as seeking courteous treatment rather
than safe access, and frequently reversed jury verdicts for the plaintiff.
Passages in court opinions, such as those quoted below, acknowledge that
female passengers’ desire or expectation for these kinds of services may well
have been greater than that of male passengers. But courts showed little
inclination to require railroads to satisfy such gendered expectations.
In a typical case, in Georgia in 1898,191 the plaintiff’s husband asked the
conductor to help his wife, who had with her a three-week-old baby, off the
train. Said the appellate court, “This, as an act of courtesy, he promised to
do.”192 But, the court continued, because neither husband nor wife told the
conductor why she needed help, or that she was sick, his promise was not
binding on the company. In any event, the court found, the presence of an
employee at the platform to help people off was enough to comply with the
promise to help:
It would greatly delay the business of the company if it could be held,
on such a promise, that it was the duty of the conductor to go to the
seats of all the ladies who had made similar requests, and assist them,
one by one, to the platform of the car, and down safely to the ground. 193
Similarly, in 1895, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that the railroad had
no duty to live up to a conductor’s promise to awaken a sleeping passenger
who was on the train with her two children, one of whom was sick. 194 The
court commented,
Common decency, as well as humanity, would always suggest that a
lady with two helpless children should be treated by the agent with the
utmost kindness and consideration, and anything short of this would
fall short of his duty as a man. But the question is, was there any act on
his part, as agent of appellant, which would authorize a recovery of
damages against the railway company? 195

191

Western & A. R.R. v. Earwood, 29 S.E. 913 (Ga. 1898).
Id. at 913.
193
Id. at 914. Because these cases tended to involve a request for assistance that was
agreed to by the conductor, but then neglected, a doctrine frequently used, as here, to release
the railroad from liability was that such promises were beyond the scope of the conductor’s
authority.
194
Missouri K. & T. Ry. of Texas v. Kendrick, 32 S.W. 42 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895).
195
Id. at 44 - 45.
192
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The court answered no. 196
However, as in many of these doctrinal areas, nothing was totally clear cut.
If the infirmity of the passenger was clear, assistance became more necessary
for safe use of trains and streetcars, and promises of assistance in all sorts of
areas might correspondingly become binding on the railroad. In this area, as
in the cases dealing with a claimed obligation to offer assistance to all women
boarding and disembarking, courts were unwilling to impose on railroads the
general obligation to take on time consuming duties, and instead looked for
the presence or absence of special circumstances. Gender informed legal
assessment of those circumstances, but was not itself considered special; that
is, the female sex of a plaintiff was frequently a factor in her alleged need for
special treatment, but could not alone justify a judicially imposed duty to
provide such treatment. For example, the jury awarded $75 in an 1895 Texas
case197 in which a husband brought suit for damages because his wife was
carried past her station, and forced to wait overnight before being carried
back, delaying medical treatment of their sick child. The appellate court
upheld the verdict. Noting that “circumstances, involving the consideration of
age, sex, or physical infirmity, may bring that within the scope of the
conductor’s duty toward a passenger which would, otherwise, be beyond the
limit of such obligation” such as a promise of personal notification about the
station, the court held that preoccupation while caring for a sick child is one
such circumstance, if the conductor knows about it.198
4. Summary of the Gendered Obligations of Railroads
In sum, there were numerous areas in which courts imposed on trains a
duty to accommodate women’s needs — needs seen as gendered, but
nonetheless reasonable. Courts described women’s “right” to certain

196
Id. at 45; see also Southern Ry. v. Hobbs, 45 S.E. 23, 25 - 26 (Ga. 1903) (any custom
of giving special assistance to unattended female passengers “[amounts] to no more than a
practice on the part of obliging and chivalrous conductors to render to ladies courteous
attention, which they were not, in their capacity as ordinary members of the traveling public,
entitled to demand as matter of right”). This case, however, may illustrate the court’s
reluctance to accommodate the plaintiff’s physical disability as much as its reluctance to
accommodate women in this particular regard.
197
Chicago, R. I. & T. Ry. v. Boyles, 33 S.W. 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895).
198
Id. at 249. The verdict was, however, reversed on the issue of proximate cause. See
also Southern Ry. v. Herron, 68 So. 551, 552 (Ala. Ct. App. 1915) (“While ordinarily the
carrier is under no duty to give the passenger personal notice that his particular station has
been reached, ‘exceptional circumstances, however, may impose this duty, as where
conditions of age, sex, or physical infirmity may bring that within the scope of the conductor’s
duty toward a passenger, although otherwise it would be beyond the limit of such obligation.’”
(quoting ROBERT HUTCHINSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS § 1121 (J. Scott
Matthews & William F. Dickenson eds., 3d ed. 1906))).
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accommodations, which the opinions presented as necessary for women to
enjoy reasonable access to trains and streetcars. But where courts considered
requested accommodations to be less necessary for women, their provision by
the railroads was described as a matter of courtesy, not duty, and courts would
impose a duty to provide the accommodations only in “special”
circumstances. Female sex was not special, for these purposes—though it
could favor a finding of negligence, it could not alone support such a finding.
B. Duties of Women Passengers on Trains
1. Gendered Expectations
The cases discussed above are about the tort system’s expectations about
what was reasonable behavior by carriers. Of course, the law had
expectations for the women involved in accidents, as well. The railroad’s
typical defense in these suits was contributory negligence;199 gender played a
crucial role in this arena of contest over what courts expected of women.
By contrast with the scholarship treating the historical “reasonable man”
standard,200 the cases indicate that women’s lawyers, railroads, and courts did
not typically present women as by nature childlike, disabled, or otherwise
unreasonable or incapable of taking care. Quite the contrary; like women’s
lawyers, railroads and courts sympathetic to the railroads would frequently

199
Sometimes the railroads and the courts would make arguments that sound to the
modern ear more like assumption of the risk than contributory negligence. As Justice
Rutledge commented in Owens v. Union Pac. R.R., 319 U.S. 715 (1943):

The common-law defenses, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the
fellow-servant rule were originated and developed in common ground. Not entirely
identical in conception, they conjoined and overlapped in many applications. The
overlapping areas first concealed, then created a confusion which only served to
create more; so that in time the three became more, rather than less,
indistinguishable.
Id. at 720. In general, it was held that the proper defense was not assumption of the risk, but
contributory negligence. See, e.g., United Rys. & Elec. v. Riley, 71 A. 970, 974 (Md. Ct. App.
1909) (“The doctrine of assumed risks or waiver of right of action, which has most frequent
application to the relation of master and servant, while theoretically distinct, in its practical
application to ordinary negligence cases between passengers and carriers, not affected by any
contractual relation other than the implied contractual obligations between them, necessarily, it
would seem, involves the doctrine of contributory negligence . . . .”); Fillingham v. St. Louis
Trans., 77 S.W. 314, 316 (Mo. Ct. App. 1903) (holding that assumption of the risk cannot apply
in train cases, because it is a theory of implied contract, and “the law forbids a carrier to
contract against the consequences of any negligence it may be guilty of in conveying
passengers”).
200
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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argue that they, too, were interested in increasing women’s freedom. In an
1883 Michigan case,201 for example, the state supreme court overturned a jury
verdict for the female plaintiff, who broke her ankle as she mistakenly got off
the train at a crossing; the train stopped for the crossing just after the
conductor called out the station’s name. The court reversed a jury finding of
negligence, stating: “The company . . . cannot be expected to treat its
passengers as children, or to put them under restraint.”202 This kind of
libertarian language was somewhat commonplace in similar cases,203 and the
railroad companies urged it as a jury charge.204
More generally, the fight in these cases was over perceived gender
difference, and who was responsible for accommodating it. The train
companies tried to argue that inasmuch as women were different from men,
the women should bear the burden of that difference. Thus, the railroads
claimed that if a woman, unlike a man, could not safely step down a distance
of three feet, she should not be able to recover if she attempted to jump the
distance — the attempt should be considered contributory negligence. The
procedural posture of the cases varied: sometimes the argument concerned the
jury charge, with the railroad seeking a very strict instruction; sometimes the
argument targeted the verdict, with the railroad seeking judgment as a matter
of law. The real subject was access: whether women would have complete
access to travel accommodations. The circumstances determined the precise
contours of the argument. When help was at least somewhat available, but the
passenger did not request or await it, the carrier would typically allege that
such failure should bar recovery. 205 When help was not available, the
railroads were forced by the facts to argue, for example, that the passenger
should have stayed on the train past her stop, gone and looked for help, and
then requested the train to go back. 206 In almost every case, the doctrinal
category used to structure this fight was contributory negligence, framed in

201

Mitchell v. Chicago & G. T. Ry., 16 N.W. 388 (Mich. 1883).
Id. at 389.
203
See, e.g., Midland Valley R.R. v. Page, 182 F. 125, 128 (E.D. Okla. 1910) (quoting
Mitchell); Malcom v. Richmond & D. R.R., 11 S.E. 187 (N.C. 1890); Falls v. San Francisco &
N. P. R.R., 31 P. 901, 902 (Cal. 1893) (quoting Malcom).
204
See Sellars v. Southern Pac. Co., 166 P. 599, 603 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 1917)
(upholding trial judge’s rejection of the jury instruction suggested by the railroad — “A
railroad company cannot be expected to treat its passengers as children, or to put them under
restraint. Passengers must take the responsibility of informing themselves concerning the
everyday incidents of railway traveling, and the company could do business upon no other
basis” — because the instruction was “argumentative, obscure, and commonplace.”).
205
See, e.g., McDermott v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 52 N.W. 85 (Wis. 1892) (reversing $3000
plaintiff’s verdict, where plaintiff asked railway employee for help, but then did not wait for
him to finish helping her before she got off and was injured).
206
See, e.g., Louisville & N. R.R. v. Lee, 12 So. 48 (Ala. 1892), discussed infra note 209.
202
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one case as, “how a prudent mind would have guided the action of such a
body as she [the plaintiff] possessed.”207
As in the cases discussed in Part I, in which a woman had to claim that she
had no control over a car driven by her husband while arguing that she took
reasonable care for her own safety, the imperatives of the doctrinal categories
required a female accident victim to make a rhetorically tricky claim. In
situations where the cause of the accident was a condition more dangerous to
women than men, a woman seeking compensation first had to argue that the
railroad had been negligent in failing to provide whatever accommodation
was necessary. But then she had to argue that her own attempt to enter or
alight from the train was not foolhardy, despite risk of harm that was usually
obvious. Essentially, she needed to undo the symmetry between negligence
and contributory negligence — to argue that negligent creation of risk covered
more ground than prudent avoidance of risk. 208 Speaking more morally
(probably a mode truer to the sources) she needed to argue that her ability to
travel was important enough that when railroads burdened that ability by
failing to provide an accommodation women predictably required, the
railroads should pay for ensuing accidents; women should bear neither the
cost of the accident nor the inconvenience of avoiding the negligently created
risks.
In responding to these cases, courts took seriously women’s need to board
or disembark, and refused to require them to hold themselves disabled by the
defendants’ negligence. They could, rather, attempt to deal with the situation
and then recover if the risk of injury was realized. 209 Passengers could be
207

Hickman v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 4 S.W. 127, 128 (Mo. 1886).
SHEARMAN & REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE 320 - 21, § 282 (1st ed. 1867), makes this
point more generally, arguing that a passenger ought not be deemed guilty of contributory
negligence if injured while taking a risk that was outweighed by the need to travel or to get
home. The treatise gives a number of examples of cases where male passengers may take
known risks, but nonetheless recover if injured. For example, a man may get off at a
dangerous landing place, “rather than be carried miles away from home”; or may “get[] on a
car in moderate motion,” “where (as is frequently the case) the drivers of horse cars constantly
refuse to come to a full stop for a male passenger”. It summarizes, “In all these and similar
cases, a passenger might directly contribute to his own injury, and yet act prudently in taking
the risk.”
Perhaps judicial willingness to uncouple negligence and contributory negligence was one
manifestation of discomfort with the harsh regime of contributory, rather than comparative,
negligence.
209
See, e.g., Delamatyr v. Milwaukee & P. C. R.R., 24 Wis. 578 (1869). The court stated:
208

‘[T]he fair result of the evidence is, that though an adult male could have jumped
down easily, yet a female passenger would encounter some danger in descending.
But then the alternative is presented, that, if it was dangerous to des cend, she ought
to have returned to her place in the carriage. I am clearly of the opinion, however,
that a railway company are not entitled to expose any passenger to the necessity of
choosing between two alternatives, neither of which he could lawfully b e called on
to choose: namely, either to go on . . ., or to take his chance of danger and jump out;
and if they do so, the choice is made it their peril.’(quoting Siner v. The Great
Western R. Co., 3 L. Rep., Exch. 150, 155 (1868) (Kelly, C.B., dissenting)).
Cf. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Lee, 12 So. 48 (Ala. 1892), a case in which the accident
happened when the train did not wait long enough at a station. As it started to pull away,
plaintiff,”in her enfeebled condition” jumped off. Id. at 48. The court held that,
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excused from taking a risk, even a known risk, if it was created by the
negligence of the railroad and if it was not too great. As they did in analyzing
negligence, courts sometimes talked about the “rights” of the women
passengers. In an 1884 Michigan case, for example, a woman passenger who
got off a train in the dark, from the rear, was not barred from recovering just
because she did not go to the front car where there was light. The court held
generally, “the same facts which tend to show negligence in the railroad
company tend in the same degree to show that the plaintiff was without fault.
If she had a right to assume that the landing place was safe, she was not
negligent in stepping down as she did.”210
Even without rights talk, courts did not allow defendants to make too
much of women’s inability to surmount small obstacles, if it seemed to the
woman, ex ante, that there was little risk. In one 1904 Iowa case, for
example, the plaintiff was injured trying to board a streetcar while her hands
were full of laundry (her business was washing).211 The court held in
response to a claim of contributory negligence by the defendant that “Women
do this daily in carrying babies, bandboxes, and birdcages, and what is so
commonly accomplished without injury or thought of danger ought not to be
held, as a matter of law, to be negligent.”212 Similarly, in a 1912 California
case, the plaintiff,

notwithstanding a jury verdict, her actions were reckless, and barred recovery. She should have
gone to the conductor and asked to be brought back: “he was legally bound [since it was his
fault for not pausing long enough], a t her request, to stop, return, and put her off, or, in default,
the company would have been responsible to her for the damage it did her.” Id. When she
jumped, therefore, “she herself took the risk of the peril involved in the venture.” Id.
210
Cartwright v. Chicago & G. T. Ry., 18 N.W. 380, 382 (1884) (Cooley, C.J.) The
general principle that passengers should be able to assume that carriers would act
nonnegligently was made as well in Caley v. Kansas City, 48 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1932), in which
a plaintiff won a verdict of $3500 for a n injury incurred as she attempted to get off a streetcar.
The carrier appealed on the ground that she had been contributorially negligent as a matter of
law. The court upheld the finding (though it vacated the verdict on an issue having to do with
special notice to the municipal defendant). The court held categorically that “[n]egligence
cannot be imputed to a passenger because she does not anticipate culpable negligence on the
part of the carrier.” Id. at 29. Sometimes, courts used the language of “rights” in discussing
alleged contributory negligence of passengers with disabilities, as well. See, e.g., Mercer v.
Cincinnati N. R.R., 115 N.W. 733, 734 (Mich. 1908) (finding plaintiff, who had a leg injury
that impeded her mobility, free of contributory negligence because she had “expect[ed], as she
had a right to expect, that defendant’s employes would meet her and assist her in alighting.”).
211
Jaques v. Sioux Cit y Traction Co., 99 N.W. 1069 (Iowa 1904).
212
Id. at 1071.
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a woman well advanced in years, . . . was nevertheless in obust health,
active, capable of performing and did perform, prior to the accident, the
household duties for her family . . . . From these facts it is reasonable to
infer that, under ordinary circumstances, she was capable of handling
the small baggage she carried with her without any great inconvenience
or trouble. 213
Thus, said the court, her encumbrances could not bar her from recovering
when she fell in the darkness at a train platform. 214
However, where a plaintiff attempted to get on or off a moving train, she
went over the line of permissible risk-taking: although men’s mobility was
protected by tort doctrine that accepted that they often did embark and alight
from moving trains,215 when the train was moving at all fast, courts generally
enforced a per se rule that a female passenger who jumped off, except in dire
peril, could not recover.216 For example the Louisiana Supreme Court held in
1903, “The law is well settled that a passenger, particularly a lady passenger,
who has parcels with her, should not seek to alight while the train is still
running.”217
When the train was moving only slowly, a more nuanced, but still often
gendered, approach was required. In an 1890 Arkansas case, for example, the
court said that the plaintiff’s
age, sex and physical condition were circumstances necessarily
affecting her safety in stepping from a moving train, and should have
been considered by the jury, in connection with all other such
circumstances in proof, in determining whether she acted prudently or
recklessly. A young active man might prudently alight, when the
attempt would be reckless in an old or lame man; and any man might
do so prudently, when it would be dangerous for a lady in female attire
to attempt it.218

213

Teale v. Southern Pac. Co., 129 P. 949, 954 (Cal. Ct. App. 1912).
Id.
215
See, e.g., Hull v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S. M. Ry., 133 N.W. 852, 855 (Minn. 1911)
(male plaintiff was not contributorially negligent as a matter of law for jumping onto a slowly
moving train: “the passenger making the attempt was physically active and his fre edom of
motion unimpeded, and there were reasons justifying him in continuing his journey on the
particular train”).
216
See, e.g., Chicago, T. H. & S. E. Ry. v. Collins, 108 N.E. 377 (Ind. App. 1915).
217
McMichael v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 34 So. 110, 112 (La. 1903); see also Louisville & N.
R.R. v. Lee, 12 So. 48 (Ala. 1892), discussed supra note 209.
218
Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. v. Tankersley, 14 S.W. 1099 (Ark. 1890). See also Little Rock
& Ft. S. Ry. v. Harkey, 15 S.W. 456, 457 (Ark. 1891), a case in which the railroad asked for a
charge directing special attention to “the jury’s right to take into consideration ‘the age, sex,
and physical condit ion of the plaintiff,’ as affecting her safety in attempting to alight from a
moving train.” The trial court charged the jury only that all the circumstances could be
considered, and the appellate court refused to overturn the jury verdict, holding that while the
requested instruction would have been fine, so was the instruction given. Id. at 457-58.
214
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Similarly, in a 1909 Massachusetts case, the defendant asked the judge to
instruct the jury “that for a woman such as this plaintiff encumbered with
bundles as was this woman to attempt to board a moving car is lack of due
care as a matter of law.” 219 The judge refused, and the appellate court upheld
that refusal, commenting that “if the car was just starting and was barely
moving, we do not think attempting to board it is negligent as a matter of
law.”220
Still, even if the jury could be instructed to consider gendered attributes as
contributing to the level of risk, courts were very unfriendly to any claim that
men and women should be held to different levels of care. The defendant
made this kind of claim in an 1899 North Carolina case,221 appealing a jury
award of $2500 to the plaintiff for an injury maintained as she attempted to
get off a streetcar. The company appealed on several grounds, including an
argument that, “as the care to be exercised by a woman, when she is placed in
a dangerous position, would be greater than that required of a man surrounded
by the same circumstances.”222 The appeals court was not well disposed
toward the plaintiff, commenting that “[i]f this Court were permitted to
criticize the verdicts of juries, we might have something to say concerning the
one delivered in this case; but that is forbidden ground to us.”223 Nonetheless,
the court held that there was nothing in the decision cited by the defendant as
authority224 “which even squints toward a holding that a woman is not bound
by the rule of ‘the prudent man,’ but ordinarily by a stricter rule.” 225
A final case encapsulates much of the gendered dynamic of these female
train passenger cases. The plaintiff in Eichorn v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas
Railway was a “strong, healthy Norwegian woman, who, unaided, had done
all of her own housework.” 226 On a winter day in 1892 she intended to go by
train with a friend from Harriston, where they both lived, to a neighboring
town. They got on from the east side of the tracks because they did not want
to run in front of the moving train, and because men at the blacksmith shop,
on the other side, liked to sit and look at ladies getting on the train. Mrs.

219

Payne v. Springfield St. Ry., 89 N.E. 536, 538 (Mass. 1909).
Id.; see also Filer v. New York Cent. R.R., 49 N.Y. 47 (1872); Haas v. Wichita R. &
Light Co., 132 P. 195 (Kan. 1913).
221
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Eichorn preferred if possible to have her back to them, rather than face them.
In addition, the Court noted,
the evidence tended strongly to show that, after the burning of the
depot, passengers got on and off the train at this point on both sides of
the road. The porters on the trains, when they would stop at Harriston
station, would get down on either side and help passengers on from
which ever side they might be standing, and would also help them off
on either side.227
There was no box to help passengers get on the train, and on this particular
day no porters, either. While her friend boarded without incident, Mrs.
Eichorn slipped, sprained her ankle, and fell down hard. The eventual result
was partial paralysis of her right side.228 The jury rendered a plaintiff’s
verdict of $3000, and the railroad appealed. The Supreme Court of Missouri
affirmed with an analysis extremely sensitive to the two, gendered, issues
raised. First, the court recognized that the question of negligence was, on a
close look, a question about what the carrier could reasonably expect from its
passengers. That is, could a railroad require that each of its passengers either
be agile or herself take the consequences? The court emphatically answered
no: “Carriers of passengers should expect that both old and young women,
feeble and delicate people, as well as the strong and robust, will seek passage
on their cars and provide suitable platforms or steps for that purpose.”229
In the jury charge on the second issue, contributory negligence, the train
company asked for and received a “reasonable woman” instruction. That is,
the jury was charged to find the plaintiff contributorially negligent if her
attempt to get on the train, from the east side and without help, was the result
of a “failure or neglect to exercise such care, caution, and foresight as a
woman of ordinary care, caution, and foresight would have exercised.”230 In
addition, however, the judge read a charge requested by the plaintiff that
phrased the standard in the masculine, defining negligence as “the lack of
such care and caution as reasonable and prudent men would exercise under
like circumstances.” On appeal, the train company claimed that this
linguistically masculine instruction was reversible error because a “reasonable
man” might well take risks a reasonable woman would refuse, and if the
plaintiff took such risks, she was contributorially negligent.
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later she gave birth to stillborn twins. See Welke, Unreasonable Women, supra note 15, at
385.
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The Missouri Supreme Court gave little credence to the defendant’s
argument, noting briefly only that “the jury would have been utterly unfit to
try any case if they did not understand that ‘men’ in this instruction was
generic and embraced women.”231 The opinion indicates that the court did not
think that the jury charge’s linguistically masculine standard instructed the
jury to assess the plaintiff’s behavior by comparison to a man’s behavior, a
comparison that the court seems to have agreed would have been
inappropriate. Nor did the court agree with the railroad’s argument that the
plaintiff should have been held to an expressly feminine standard of care — a
standard that would have incorporated norms of feminine timidity. Rather,
the court seems to have believed that the jury was instructed to compare Mrs.
Eichorn’s behavior to that of a gender-neutral reasonable person, and the
court approved this standard. 232
C. Conclusion
When they confronted gender difference in the context of the
boarding/alighting cases, common law courts, influenced by the concept of
common carriage, held that even when women’s needs were different from
men’s, those needs could be reasonable, and should be respected. At the same
time, they allowed railroads to escape liability for what the courts considered
discourteous behavior, where the claim of negligence would impose on
railroads a time-consuming duty, and no special circumstances existed
making the discourtesy a large obstacle to safe train or streetcar travel. The
tort system in this period and these contexts frequently first noticed women’s
needs and their ability to take care, to exercise prudence, and to behave
reasonably, and then balanced women’s needs against those of other actors.
No less important, courts required, and therefore acknowledged, that women
act reasonably. Courts included in their analyses the very real restrictions on
women’s agility, which rendered them less able to avoid harm than men, but
refused to hold women to a norm of timidity.
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Id. at 997.
Other evidence in the opinion supports my interpretation that the court thought that
actual gender - neutrality, rather than either masculinity or femininity, was the generally
appropriate standard for contributory negligence. The court pointedly used the neuter in its
description of another case’s holding, even though that case was about a man, describing
contributory negligence in terms of the conduct of “an ordinarily prudent person.” Id. at 996.
This choice of words must have been a considered one, because only a page later, in a context
where women were categorically excluded — fact-finding — the court wrote that “only when
the facts are such that all reasonable men must draw the same inference from them” should a
judge take a case from the jury. Of course, even if gender-neutrality was the goal, it may be
that it was an impossible one, particularly since women were excluded from both fact-finding
and law-giving. Nonetheless, it is worth noticing that the court here was attempting genderneutrality, and upholding a finding for the female plaintiff.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has examined in some detail reported court opinions between
1860 and 1930 that arose out of three fact patterns. The cases show that
common law courts, far from naively erasing gender by subsuming women
into the male category of “reasonable men” or a purportedly neutral, but no
less male category of “reasonable persons,” actually treated gender as an
important factor in assessing appropriate standards of care, where perceived
gender difference was highlighted. A careful exploration of the complex
interplay of tort doctrine, statutory law, and ideas about gender yields a
paucity of exclusionary rhetoric, a good deal of careful line-drawing relating
to women’s reasonable needs, and quite a lot of law favorable to the actual
women claimants. One reason for the unexpected woman-friendliness in the
texts of these opinions might be that men, as the nearly-universal
decisionmakers, imposed a masculine norm so pervasive that it merited no
comment. Holmes wrote in The Common Law of “[t]he ideal average prudent
man, whose equivalent the jury is taken to be in many cases, and whose
culpability or innocence is the supposed test.”233 In a legal culture in which
lay fact finders were considered able to decide cases because they were
themselves the measure of their own inquiry, a world in which only men
served as finders of fact or law,234 it would not be surprising that the creators
of the reasonable man, the common lawyers of the nineteenth century, had no
anxiety about his maleness, and therefore failed to discuss it more
frequently. 235 But another explanation for the fact that, at least in these cases,
turn-of-the-century tort law decisions cases that discussed gender rarely
stigmatized or excluded women is that perhaps there was less exclusion of
women than has been assumed.

233

HOLMES, supra note 19, at 111; see also, e.g., Hainlin v. Budge, 47 So. 825, 832 (Fla.
1908) (in applying the standard of the “reasonably prudent man,” “the judge or the juryman
[has] . . . in his mind a concrete individual who is no less a person than himself”). But see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF T ORTS § 283 cmt. c (1965) (“The reasonable man . . . is not to be
identified with any real person; and in particular he is not to be identified with the members of
the jury, individually or collectively.”).
234
Women jurors, though not completely nonexistent toward the end of this Article’s
period, were exceedingly rare. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 289 (1947); R. Justin
Miller, The Woman Juror, 2 OR. L. REV. 30 (1922). And women judges were even rarer. See
Larry Berkson, Women on the Bench: A Brief History, 65 JUDICATURE 286 (1982).
235
This kind of exclusivity, of course, is not an unusual feature of legally -sanctioned
positive description. Catherine MacKinnon, for example, writes that the “point of view [of
male dominance] is the standard for point-of-viewlessness, its particularity the meaning of
universality.” Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 638 - 39 (1983); see also Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking
Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 893 (1989) (“male-based perspectives, images, and experiences are
often taken to be the norms in law”).

